

PRO file KV4/1196

**Liddell diary January 1 – May 30,
1945**, EXTRACTS, CONTINUED

January 6, 1945: [. . .] Lastly I came to the delicate subject [talking with Peter Loxley, Intelligence liaison officer, Foreign Office] of Johnnie Dashwood, Will Codrington and the F O Security Service. [*The following page is blanked out*].

The same reasoning applies in the case of the leakage at Ankara. The safe had been opened more than 2 years and 8 months ago and [British ambassador] Knatchbull-Hugesson's important documents had appeared on ISOS. There were various theories about how these things had happened but in fact nobody knew. We had not even been told about the incident officially. We just learned little snips here and there. Had we been called in we should have sent out somebody with a knowledge of secret sources, [Herbert] Cussen and Burt [of Scotland Yard], and we should have not abandoned the case until we had tried every possible means of discovering the culprit[. . .]

All this arose I thought from an incident which occurred several years ago when Cussen and Burt had interviewed the PM's cook on a leakage case. For some reason or other Will Codrington had intervened and insisted on being present. He kept breaking into the interrogation and so embarrassed Burt and Cussen that they had to ask him to desist. Ever since then he had been hostile to this department and extremely cagey about all security matters affecting the FO. [. . .]

January 8, 1945: We then talked about the battle. I told C that Van Moylan, of Dutch Security, whom I had seen the other day, had told me that he was in Brussels when the [Luftwaffe] attack was made on the aerodromes [*on January 1, 1945 at dawn*]. It seemed that we had been caught with our trousers down. Van Moylan had seen some 40 planes burning on the ground. They were all lined up almost touching each other and must have made a perfect target. C said that on that day we lost altogether 165 planes on the ground. He had warned the air force but presumably they had done nothing about it.

January 14, 1945: Dick [White] arrived from Paris about 4:30 soaked to the skin [. . .] [*Not transcribed: Ardennes counter attack problems*]. Feeling generally is rather bad. The Americans dislike us, the French dislike the Americans, and are generally trying to drive a wedge between them and ourselves. De Gaulle threatened to withdraw his troops from the line if Strasbourg was not defended. Eisenhower had to respond to this piece of blackmail. It was at this point that Winston and the CIGS went to Paris. At a dinner at which [Kenneth] Strong [*Intelligence chief, of SHAEF*] was present, the PM said that he did not intend to tie himself to France and that he was convinced that the future of the world lay in close Anglo-American cooperation. As a proof of these sentiments he was advocating the maintenance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff for ten years after this war.

January 17, 1945: Sclater [sic] has seen DDY who has told him that GC&CS have had an inquest on the [codebreaking] product available at the time of Rundstedt's offensive. The view is that all the information was there but that the interpretation was faulty. This confirms what I had previously heard.

January 20, 1945: I saw Peter [Loxley] at the Club. I asked him what

been the result of the conversation between [Sir Alexander] Cadogan and [P J] Grigg [Secretary of State for War] à propos of the enquiry into the relations between ourselves and Section V. he said that Grigg had been worried about [Sir Edward] Bridges conducting the enquiry since his absence would undoubtedly have come to the notice of the PM who would have wanted to know all about it and moreover he felt that as much as the material was very delicate, particularly Roger Hollis's work, it would be undesirable to have papers relating to the enquiry floating about in Downing Street, where they might be seen by the Beaver [Lord Beaverbrook? [. . .] Peter entirely agreed and mentioned off the record the atmosphere in which SOE's future was being discussed. There had been several minutes by Eden and by the Chiefs of Staff and the papers had come up to the PM at the end of a rather tiring day. He had written across them, "Let Major Morton look into this and advise. SIS I know but who are SOE? I know S Menzies. He is head of MI5." [Website: *It is not plain whether this extraordinary passage is serious or not* [. . .]

Up to Dec 31, 1944 the French had arrested 2,300, passed 300 death sentences, 180 life sentences, 340 prison sentences and an additional 1,800 cases are under investigation. As many as 50,000 future cases are foreseen. In Belgium there have been 495 death sentences, 167 life imprisonments, and 1,207 terms of imprisonment.

January 23, 1945: [Re: *The failure of Intelligence to detect the coming Ardennes offensive*] Dick Butler saw Keith, Strong's PA who is in hospital over here[. . .] There is no doubt therefore that the intelligence appreciation was inadequate. There was a frightful flap going on in SHAEF for some days after the offensive opened. It even got to the stage of planning what port should be held as a bridgehead if France had to be evacuated.

January 27, 1945: [*Story of the SOE disaster in Holland 1942-3:*]

I have read Stamp's note on the activities of *Abwehr* 3F, [*sic. IIIF*] The Hague, against SOE. It is purely factual, and worded in moderate terms, but is an appalling indictment of SOE methods and negligence.

The story began in June 1942 when a certain JOHANNES and a W/T operator were dropped in Holland. J[OHANNES] had been sent to contact the OD, an indigenous loyalist organisation. He was to tell its leaders that he had come on a joint Dutch–British mission and was to disclose to them the plan for Holland which had been worked out. He was to obtain their comments on this plan and to emphasise that the Dutch Govt. in London had approved it in principle and expected it to be accepted in substance. After introducing himself to the leaders of the OD, J[OHANNES] was to make contact with its various sub-groups operating throughout the country. He would report back to London who would send out a trained organiser and instructors to the groups as and when J[OHANNES] reported they were ready to receive them. For the purpose of carrying out this mission, J[OHANNES] had to organise reception committees, weapons, and supplies and for the additional personnel which were to be sent.

The indications are that J[OHANNES] never operated except under the control of the Germans or that he was certainly under control in November [1942] if not in August of that year [1942]. SOE were informed on a set which was obviously under control that J[OHANNES] had been arrested on the 8th Nov. 1942.

It is astonishing that this arrest did not indicate to SOE that it was quite hopeless to continue the undertaking if the chief organiser

with all the plans was under German control. To act upon the assumption that a captured agent has not been broken is to court not only mortal peril for those concerned but disaster to the whole enterprise.

After the 8th Nov. 1942 the part assigned to J[OHANNES] by the Abwehr was carried out in the name of KALE, his successor who had been sent out from this country as his No. 2. Upwards of 25 receptions [*of SOE parachute agents*] were arranged over K.'s W/T set and no less than 10 W/T operators were despatched from this country.

As SOE had failed to get back J[OHANNES] owing to his arrest, K[ALE] was asked to send to England some other person thoroughly well informed about the progress of the secret organisation. In face of this requirement the *Abwehr* determined to go through all the motions of supplying such a person.

On the one hand this would serve the purpose of allaying any suspicion which might be felt in London, and on the other hand SOE should be made to disclose the method by which agents could be evacuated from Europe.

On 14.3.43 SOE were therefore informed that K[ALE] would send his chief assistant, who was called ANTON. The Germans were asked for particulars about Anton and gave his name as Nicolas de Wild, of a certain address at The Hague. DAMEN, who[m] we subsequently captured, was in fact the occupant of the address and on instructions from the Abwehr was to say, if anyone called, that de Wild was away but would return in a few days. When SOE decide to arrange for Anton's

[Oops! Pages 78-81 not copied!!]

[page 82:] the known facts; had trick questions been put to the agents; had each mishap been examined with a view to appreciating its possible implications on the position of themselves and the organisation as a whole; had each returning agent been meticulously questioned not because he was suspect but with a view to obtaining all possible information from him; above all, had a record been kept which set out in chronological order all the known facts regarding the enterprise and the sources from which such facts were known, a record which would have been readily available for consultation in considering all the above matters; had all this been done, there is very little doubt that the SOE organisation in Holland would not have met the fate that overcame it.

January 29, 1945: Bennett came to ask me about the atomic bomb. He is responsible for *Tube Alloys*, who are concerned with experimental work. The DG asked him the other day what the Germans were doing in this line. He wanted to know whether I would keep him informed. I said that the atomic bomb was not really our business; occasionally I heard about it from C., very confidentially, but that I was not really at liberty to pass this on. Bennett is apparently thinking of asking [—] of the Naval section of SIS for the required information as he thinks that it places him in rather an awkward position if he cannot answer the DG's question[. . .] I recommended Bennett to lay off this inquiry since if C thought he was asking about the atomic bomb he would probably have a fit. C is under the impression that only he and two others in his dept have ever heard of it.

February 2, 1945: Lennox has just told me that the last plane out for the Yalta conference carrying 12 passengers including Peter Loxley has come down in the Med off Lampedusa[. . .] I saw "C" later in the evening, he told me that a wireless message had been received

from the plane, which was a York [*civilian passenger plane developed from the Lancaster Bomber*], which said, "Running out of petrol, coming down in the ditch." It seems incredible that a plane of this kind could run out of petrol.

February 6, 1945: Marriott and [Hugh] Astor came in to tell me that the French, with which we have been looking into the case of GILBERT, have now come forward with an accusation against Boddington of SOE who they think was working for the Germans. We have said that they should state their full reasons in writing when we will of course conduct the most careful inquiry. It may moreover be necessary now for numerous other witnesses to come over from France. The accusation will presumably be based on statements of people held in France, and if we are to bring a charge against Boddington we ought to have their first hand evidence.

February 9, 1945: I had a talk with J C [Masterman] about the Boddington case. I wanted him to take it over but he is evidently reluctant to do so. He advances the view that we should not be mixed up with it more than is necessary since it is a matter between the French and SOE. I explained to him that we could not altogether take that line since it had always been our policy to assist SOE in any inquiries, particularly in the case of a British agent who was thought to have gone wrong. It was left that we should see what the outcome of our meeting with the French would be.

Vaudreuil, Kressmann, Hugh Astor, Herbert, Marriott and I took part in the discussion on Boddington, this afternoon, I said that our own course in this matter would be to present the indictment to the Security Division of SOE[. . .] We could not for example prevent them from consulting [Colonel Maurice] Buckmaster. Had the French any objection? [. . .] It was agreed that there was

at the moment no evidence against Boddington and that the theory that JEANNETTE was the culprit fitted all the facts. The French felt however that Boddington as so linked with JEANNETTE that if she were wrong he must have known something about it, if indeed he was not a party to her activities. There is no doubt that some very curious facts have emerged and that Boddington has quite a lot to explain. I undertook to see SOE tomorrow[. . .] It was agreed that so far as BRUTUS was concerned we could renounce any interest in the bodies at present under arrest. All we asked was that their cases should not be tried publicly in the near future. An assurance on this point was given.

February 10, 1945: John Senter came over. I showed him the memo which Kressmann had prepared in which it is suggested that Boddington may be the culprit in the GILBERT case[. . .] There is no doubt I think that the French rather have it in for Buckmaster, partly I believe because certain SOE people have made approaches to their former agents and asked them to continue working for them in France. This has got to the ears of the French who naturally resent it. Buckmaster has been making a tour of his various circuits with a view to giving rewards and the French have been placing considerable difficulties in his way[. . .] There is no doubt that in some ways they would be rather glad to prove not only that Buckmaster's circuits were blown but that his head man, a British subject, was a traitor. Boddington is apparently a rather curious character, who has lived most of his life in France and the possibility of his having acted as an agent cannot be entirely ruled out although so far there does not appear to be any concrete evidence. [. . .]

Anthony [Blunt][. . .] then talked to me about Hill, the SOE man in Moscow, who is apparently very well in with the Ambassador [Clark-Kerr] and very much in the latter's confidence. There are

rather unpleasant rumours about the reasons for this association. [*These were allegations about a homosexual relationship*]. It is thought that Hill may be rendering certain services which if known to the Soviet authorities would place the Ambassador in an extremely embarrassing position. This may be all be idle gossip but there is no doubt that Hill sees a great many papers in Moscow. Here has recently been a suggestion that Hill should take over the SIS liaison as well as the SOE. C [head of the SIS] has definitely turned this down. It would be by no means surprising if Hill was giving more than he got. He certainly gets very little. The Soviet people brought back his mistress from Siberia and she is now living with him for obvious reasons.

February 12, 1945: John Senter came in. He had read the memo about Boddington and had come definitely to the conclusion that there was no real substance in the allegations made. We decided that Kressmann should have a meeting with [Frank?] Soskice of SOE tomorrow and that at the conclusion of this meeting they should decide whether it was desirable for Bardet to be brought over.

February 14, 1945: I saw John Senter, Soskice, Kressmann. They had an all night session about Boddington. Kressmann is I think fairly well satisfied that Boddington is not the culprit and I think somewhat shaken on the question of JEANNETTE. Soskice does not think that either are guilty, but is still open minded.

February 15, 1945: I had a word with Jim about the possibility of a Pole attempting to assassinate the PM in the light of recent decisions at the Crimea Conference. I rather wondered whether the Poles had consider this although it might be that they could not do much more than they are doing already. I thought that we were under a certain obligation to keep our ears down in Polish

circles. If we knew the kind of people who were likely to make trouble we might try [tapping] their telephones. Jim said he did not think they would be likely to talk about this sort of thing on the telephone I pointed out that telephone conversations rarely gave direct evidence that but that they did at times convey something to those who had knowledge of the general set up. When speaking on the telephone people generally are in the habit of guarding their conversation against the operator, but not against the informed listener.[. . .]

I have been told about two further secret decisions at the Crimea Conference. One is that the Dardanelles are to be internationalised. What precisely this means I don't know, unless the area is to be taken away from the Turks and come under international control. Winton has apparently undertaken to break the news to the Turks, although Joe originally offered to do so, The other is that apparently [Field Marshal] Alexander is to command our troops for occupation, instead of Monty.

The C E [*Counter-Espionage*] summary of AFHQ for Dec 1944 shows that 56 agents had been captured excluding two parties of saboteurs in uniform numbering 13. Altogether in the campaign 82 cases have been tried, 29 executed and 29 sentenced to imprisonment.

A document captured recently emanating from the OKW in Berlin directs all *Abteilungsleiter* in north Italy to prepare for the eventual liquidation of Italian collaborators who had had access to secret information about the German intelligence organization since experience has shown that they cannot be trusted. This liquidation is to take place at a given signal, when the Germans withdraw from N Italy. It is hoped to put these documents to good use in the near future.

February 16, 1945: At today's 12 o'clock meeting it was disclosed that OSTRO had submitted information relating to the movement of some 5 Canadian divisions from the Italian front. As this information is true it seems more than ever desirable that OSTRO should somehow be torpedoed. The Controller is taking this matter up with C. This is the third time we have tried to get OSTRO removed, and the present suggestion is that we should try and buy him up or bump him off.

The transmitter from Bavaria known as PHONEY has come to an end and is clearly in the hands of the Gestapo. Meanwhile one of the party seems to have got into Switzerland. He says that Rhode has been arrested. It now transpires that SOE have been communicating with this transmitter for some considerable time. They have come forward quite naïvely with a story about the arrest of a man called Rhode who was operating a clandestine transmitter with which they had been in touch.

February 19, 1945: [*Kellar controls Mid East in MI5 B Division in Palestine:*] I have just got Alec Kellar's report on his visit to the Mid East. He begins by saying that it is no exaggeration to say that on the British Govt's present handling of the Palestine problem will mainly depend our ability to sustain the predominating influence we enjoy in the mid East, an area where our interests, political and strategic, are being increasingly menaced by both Russian and French designs and by an accumulating xenophobia in the Arab States fanned by a growing belief that our policy in Palestine consciously favours the Jew in preference to the Arab. As that belief grows – and the fact that we took no punitive toll in Palestine for the assassination of Lord Moyne is turning belief into conviction – so are we correspondingly losing from the very considerable reserves of Arab goodwill which we have acquired for ourselves during the war years. It is the view of the authorities

on the spot that more trouble must be expected in further and increasing acts of terrorism inspired as it may soon be by Arabs as well as by Jews, and that organised rebellion, following any announcement of policy, is a policy that cannot be discounted.

The Arabs within Palestine are admittedly disunited and lacking in leadership, separated into no less than 6 different political parties, they show little evidence of political maturity or of any present ability to sink their differences, [. . .]

If the British contemplate partition, the indications are that the Arabs will not be entirely united. Ibn Saud's belated and reluctant agreement to join the newly-formed League of Arab States and his recent meeting with King Farouk are considered as being less concerned with a desire to achieve Arab unity as with securing an alliance with the Egyptian King against the Hashemite House now ruling in Iraq and Trans-Jordan.

The Emir Abdullah of Trans-Jordan too is more concerned with his own dynastic ambitions than with more ambitious schemes for Arab unity. He covets a Greater Syria with his capital in Damascus and to secure this prize from our hands he is prepared to see Palestine west of the Jordan in Jewish suzerainty[. . .]

On the Zionist side, Dr [Chaim] Weizmann, during his present visit to Palestine, has warned his fellow members of the Executive that if terrorism continues the Zionist cause stands in grave danger of losing not only much of the moral support it enjoys outside Palestine but more important of all, the political and very practical sympathy of Mr Churchill. So it is that the [Jewish] Agency is now cooperating with the British authorities security, policy and secretariat, in an attempt to stamp out terrorism. This cooperation is however conditional and limited. The Agency will only

continue as long as they believe that their ultimate demands will be met. Meanwhile they are only passing to the [British Palestine] police lists of names for the latter to make the arrests.

The police who have no adequate records, feel bound to act on the Agency's information. They receive very little information from either the Agency about the organisation, either of the Stern Group or the Irgun. This is because the Agency are only too well aware that the police have signally failed to penetrate these two organizations and that the CID are now to a very large extent dependent on the Agency's security officers for most of the evidence upon which the arrest of terrorists can be effected[. . .]

The more the police become dependent on the [Jewish] Agency, the more authority the Agency consider they acquire and indeed do, in the civil administration of Palestine.

This extra-constitutional action which the Agency is now allowed to take in Palestine has in fact given it something of the status of an *imperium in imperia*. It kidnaps or openly arrests terrorists with its own personnel, usually seconded for the work from the ranks of the Agency's paramilitary and entirely illegal Haganah organization. The suspects are interrogated in Jewish settlement hide-outs by methods admittedly unorthodox but fruitful of the result.

Some of these suspects are later released, others are handed over to the police, while the remainder continue in Agency custody largely because they are in a position to supply information which the Agency prefer to vet before passing to the [British Palestine] police, or wish to exclude from the latter altogether.

There is a certain amount of cooperation between the Agency and

SIME in Egypt. Trusted Arabs of the Agency are serving in the British forces in units where the terrorists are thought to be.

Enquiries in Palestine have shown fairly conclusively that the Polish Army Intelligence has been deliberately building up the Irgun.

[*Two lines blanked out. . .*] the names of 5 Revisionist Jews, among them Begin [*sic.* Menachem Begin] the leader of the organization, who were released a year ago by the Polish Army in the Mid East for political propaganda purposes in Palestine. The Stern Group according to the Agency appears substantially untouched.

There is now positive evidence that it is receiving support from French officials in the Levant, both in the matter of arms and finance. French support is being given firstly in retaliation for the part we played last year in supporting Lebanese and Syrian attempts for independence, and secondly because an Independent Jewish State would work in opposition to the Greater Syria scheme which if brought about would undermine French influence. The Greater Syria scheme includes Trans-Jordan.

There is a certain amount of evidence that the Irgun and Stern Group may be planting agents abroad for the purpose of political assassination. Kellar does not think much of the Palestine Police or the quality of their work. Through their own ignorance of the situation, they have virtually been thrown into the arms of the Agency.

The revelations about the true state of affairs has come as rather a shock to Rymer Jones, whose head of CID, Giles, is regarded by everyone as a difficult personality with whom to work. He is a Cypriot married to a Maltese and suffers from an inferiority complex, The Deputy Supt. Catling, who is in charge of the political

Intelligence Section, stated quite openly that his dept. resented the activities of the DSO. The fact is of course that Catling is sitting on a volcano and does not really know it. Kellar clearly thinks that Hunloke should be withdrawn when he has concluded his extra year[. . .]

Kellar closes his note with an appendix on future policy in Palestine in which he mentions that the Minister Resident, Sir E Grigg, is advocating a scheme in which the actual administration of the country would be run by a representative of 3, an Englishman, an Arab and a Jew, who would be subject to a supervising Commission constituted by the United Nations and open to both Arabs and Jews for representation. No provision however is made in Grigg's scheme for safeguarding British Imperial interests in the new state and this being so Lord Gort stresses that the proposals if implemented would gravely endanger British strategic requirements in the Mid East. If Gort thought that Grigg's policy had the official backing of the Govt, he would hand in his resignation.'

February 20, 1945: I saw Tommy last night. He had a rather different story about the decisions at the Crimea Conference. As far as he could recall, the question of the Montreux agreement was rather shelved. On the whole the view is that we got more than we gave. The Russians were persuaded to take reparations to some extent in kind instead of in cash. They were also made to agree that only two of their federated states should have representation at the Peace Conference. The PM before the Crimea Conference telephoned to Roosevelt saying that everything would be done to assist his passage. He concluded, 'From Gibraltar to Malta, let nobody falter. From Malta to Yalta, let nobody alter.'

February 21, 1945: After lunch I saw Passy, Manuel and Vaudreuil. This was purely a courtesy visit. They were extremely friendly and

said they would always welcome the presence of MI5 in Paris. There was a general feeling that they have far more confidence in us than in anyone else[. . .]

Dev [de Valera] has agreed to the establishment of Radar at Malin Head. The apparatus is used to enable our Air Force to locate their position when dealing with U-boats. The station will be run notionally by the Irish ostensibly for the guidance of aircraft. The RAF are to be in control until peace time when the Irish trainees will take over.' [*Role of Cavendish-Bentinck as Peter Loxley's successor in so far as receipt of Secret Source material was concerned, going through to Cadogan.*]

February 22, 1945: In the evening I saw John Booth, who [. . .] wants me to visit the 11th Armoured Division if I go to Belgium. He has a tremendous admiration form his own unit and in fact for Monty and the British as a fighting force. He has unfortunately very little to say for the Americans[. . .] In the Ardennes they were caught completely on the hop, having taken no precautions whatever. John told me there was no possible excuse for not knowing what was going on in front of them. They clearly had no recce parties out in front and no air recce otherwise they would have been bound to see the Panzer tracks. One of the excuses for the debacle give by Bradley [was] that he was moving his headquarters This John says is typical.

February 23, 1945: J.C. [Masterman?] has come in to tell me that Drew wants BRONX and GELATINE kept on to act as background for his rocket deception. He believes that this deception has succeeded in moving the main [sic. mean?] point of impact about 6 miles in a N E direction.

March 3, 1945: [*Long analysis, 6 pp, of MIRS report on German appreciation of D-day landings: The overwhelming Allied firepower,*

feeling of hopelessness, etc. . .] The message received by TATE last week instructed him to report in detail upon the effects of and defences against the V1, This has been regarded by the Service Depts as of first-class importance, since it affords confirmation of evidence from other sources that the Germans contemplate the renewed use of V.1. In fact, V.1 started against [*sic*] last night[. . .]

In Feb further sabotage agents trained by Skorzeny's organization were dropped in France[. . .] Samples of the German explosive Nipolit disguised to look like rubber shoe soles were included[. . .]

Passy, who has been vigorously attacked by the Left, has returned to France and has been appointed Directeur Adjoint of the DGER. He thus becomes technical head of intelligence activities in France.[. . .]

In connection with our SHAEF commitments arrangements were made to adapt Camp 020 to the handling of women. It is now possible to send a female prisoner to Holloway where she is specially segregated and can be taken daily to 020 for interrogation as required.

[*Not transcribed: Statistics on V.1 and V.2 incidents. . .*] The most serious [V2] incident occurred on the 25th Nov when a rocket fell at New Cross, demolished the local Woolworth stores, killed 160 people and seriously injured 108. [*See too the last pages of diary, below*].

March 5, 1945: HEWITT, our first renegade, has been sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. [*Was this Schellenberg's Hewitt? An American in Stockholm?*]

March 21, 1945: [*Vague reference to the peace proposals coming from SD in Italy to Switzerland. The American operation CROSSWORD was running by now between Allen Dulles and SS Obergruppenführer Karl Wolff, Höchster SS und Polizeiführer Northern Italy: see March 27, below*]

March 22, 1945: Tangye came to talk to me about the Vermehrens [*Abwehr traitors who had defected to the British from the German embassy in Ankara*]. After tremendous labour he has in conjunction with them produced one article which is acceptable to *The Daily Mail*. He says that the Vermehrens are being paid £600 p.a. He cannot see what use they can possibly be to SIS in the future.

March 27, 1945: C told me that peace feelers were going on in Switzerland through a man called Wolf [*sic*] who was a general in the SS and had gone to Switzerland from the Italian front. The Russian have been informed. C was sceptical about the motives. He thought possibly that the Party might be engineering this move in order to show that the Generals had let them down. On the other hand, as this man was a SS general it would not look too well. C thought that the OKW, who were living in a kind of dream world, imagined that the wheels of the German Army machine were still revolving in clockwork fashion, and were issuing orders accordingly. Hitler was constantly saying that this bridge and that bridge was to be destroyed at once. In fact, however nothing is happening[. . .]

March 29, 1945: At my lunch with Walter Scott and Sclater we discussed the future of Radio Security[. . .] He [Scott] said then [*at the time of tightening up Signal Security in the Middle East*] that we could probably only maintain the lead over the Germans for about a year or 18 months. He has apparently proved more or less correct since as a result of our preventive measures, the Germans

have learned many lessons and have tightened up their procedure to such a degree that GC&CS are having a really rough time.

He told us that in France he had discovered an appalling leakage of information by the Americans. Strong, on the basis of ULTRA had told him that the Germans were aware of all movements of our troops. His American opposite number either could not or would not offer any helpful suggestions but one of his junior officers on looking into the position discovered that the American Military Police were communicating by Slidex code, the origin, movements and destination of all troops passing through their positions. Slidex only has a life of a few hours; it was not surprising therefore that the Germans were fairly well informed.

March 30, 1945: I learnt through Lennox that the Chiefs of Staff when asked for a review by the PM have said that they expect to be in Bremen on 4th April, in Hamburg on the 12th, and to more or less wind up operations by April 15th. This is of course only a very tentative estimate. There is at the moment an official black-out, but yesterday we were reported in the vicinity of Munster and it may well be that by now we are in Hannover.

Being Good Friday, there is no *Evening Standard* and Lennox has not been able to make up his maps.

March 31, 1945: [*Blank*] rang me up about Kremer in Stockholm. [*Website: A German military attaché, Abwehr agent, who was in fact merely running up colossal expenses and sending fictitious reports to Berlin*]. The Swedes have decided to expel him and are arresting certain of their own nationals who had been associated with him[. . .] They cannot intern him as he is a diplomat[. . .] V.1 and V.2 ceased last Thursday presumably owing to our successful advance into Germany and the possibility of Holland be-

ing cut off.

April 3, 1945: [*Not transcribed: Details on former Spanish Republican statesman Juan Negrin, exiled to England, whose associates are being followed on behalf of the Spanish ambassador, the Duke of Alba.*]

April 5, 1945: A report by CIOS [. . .] Two infra-red receivers have been found in the University at Bonn. This is the first captured of this special type of equipment which had been made and represents something new for allied research and development in that field. A Dr Richter had been interrogated and had given considerable information[. . .] JIC have tried to estimate the likelihood and possible forms of a last desperate throw by the German naval and air forces.

The German Navy has available the *Lützow*, *Admiral Hipper*, *Prinz Eugen* and 3 or 4 light cruisers and up to 16 destroyers. To these may perhaps be added the *Admiral Scheer*. These forces might be used (a) to break out into the Atlantic[. . .] (b) attack convoys off our East coast, [. . .]

At the moment the enemy disposes of about 170 U-boats, operationally effective. Of these about 65–70 are at sea on any one day from bases in Norway. The total at any one time could be raised to 150[. . .]

Operations by the German air force[. . .] impossible to employ more than a small proportion of their present estimated first line strength of 5,700 aircraft for a last desperate attack on London[. . .] few aerodromes within a range of 400 miles of London from which jet propelled Ar [Arado] 234s could reach London carrying a bomb load; they could not however return. Jet propelled Me 262s could no longer reach London from any airfield even on a non-return

basis[. . .] The morale of the GAF is low[. . .] The use of chemical or bacteriological bomb[s] cannot be altogether excluded. The Germans might appreciate that the Allies would be unwilling to undertake reprisals in kind against an area which they were about to occupy. [. . .]

Cecil and I were taken over the Admiralty War Room[*housed in the underground Citadel*]. We saw all the plots of enemy submarines. All information both from Y and other sources relating to enemy submarines is brought to this room by the speediest possible channel. There is a teleprinter service direct with Bletchley. When a submarine is reported on its outward journey an estimate is made from all the facts available as to the course it is most likely to take. An average speed is taken and day to day the position of the submarine is recorded. It may be that after some days a piece of further positive information will pin-point the position, *e.g.* a weather report [*transmitted by that U-boat*].

The number of submarines at sea is computed fairly accurately from Y sources. It then remains to route the trans-Atlantic convoys in such a way as to avoid any submarine action[. . .] Captain Wynn [*sic.* Rodger Winn, later Lord Justice Winn] who showed us round, said that the box that had floated from the German submarine off the west coast of Ireland had been quite helpful in the matter of codes[. . .] The morale of U-boat crews is in general fairly high. The capture of Bremen and Hamburg will not have very much effect except perhaps to increase the number of U-boats operating in the Atlantic[. . .]

April 11, 1945: *The Times* today gives the war casualty figures for the Empire, to February 28th this year, since the outbreak of war. The total killed among UK forces is 216,287; missing, 30,967; wounded 255,142, P/Ws 183,242, total 685,638. The total for the British Em-

pire is made up as follows: Killed, 306,984, missing 70,872, wounded 422,476, P/W 326,470, total 1,126,802. [. . .]

On the 17th March Ribbentrop had an off the record conversation with the Japs. [*Long details follow, not transcribed here: possibility of separating USSR from Britain and America.*]

Hitler stated [to Japanese military attaché] however on the 28th March that he adhered to his view that it would be Germany's disadvantage if either she or Japan approached the USSR. The matter would therefore have to be dropped until Hitler thought the situation was ripe for negotiations.

He [Ribbentrop?] had no objection in principle to coming to terms with the Russians although he categorically refused to entertain such an idea with Britain and America. Ribbentrop had a further conversation with the Jap on the 5th April. He said that although the Führer had originally intended to launch a big offensive in the east about May or June, the deterioration of the situation in the west had made this extremely difficult. The reason given was the collapse of the Luftwaffe. Ribbentrop had mentioned again to Hitler the subject of making peace. Hitler had however looked annoyed and replied that he had already made the matter quite clear to Ribbentrop, not once but twice. There was therefore nothing to be done except to have the machinery ready and to approach the Russians in Stockholm if a suitable opportunity occurred. [*Website note: Soviet ambassador Madame Kollontai was a channel used frequently by both sides*]

April 13, 1945: Reports from MSS have recently become available showing that the RSHA is in W/T contact with several parties of agents in Russia. One of these parties is working in the neighbourhood of Rybinsk. Three further agents were dropped in this area

to join the party already there. The second party also controlled from Danzig appears to have had an agent in Moscow. The party was apparently landed by plane near Moscow with the task of settling down there and reporting back to Danzig, on the position not only in Moscow but in the Kremlin itself. [. . .]

May 1, 1945: [...] He thinks that such specimens may be found in IG Farben. I put him on to Professor Lindstead [*probably Sir Reginald Patrick Linstead?*] of CIOS [*Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee*].

We have obtained ORANGE's co-operation in the Aeschmann case.

Viv. rang up about the case of Crocker who has been paying notes to a man called Burnett who runs a string of night-clubs and whose account was brought to the notice of Ned Reid. Crocker apparently handles all the finances of RSS and is regarded by Gambier-Parry as reliable. Viv. is proposing to see GP about this matter. I told him how delicate the matter was and that I did not wish on any account the information to go back to Burnett. I would speak to Ned Reid and see how far we could go. It was not surprising if Burnett was supplying RSS with Black Market products.

May 2, 1945: On 20th April our MA in Madrid telephoned to say that instructions had been issued for the Germans to cancel their Lufthansa serviced to Spain owing to lack of landing grounds in Germany. A pilot of the last German plane which left Barcelona had instructions to report to the personal Luftstaffel of Hitler and Himmler consisting of 8 planes with flying radius of 9,000 kms which had been prepared for a flight to Japan or Manchukuo.

A Civil Affairs report dated 14.4.45 states that at Idar-Oberstein the Germans are reported to have risen against the Volkssturm when

it was planning to defend the city against allied occupation and in Seliegenstadt the burgomaster was beaten by the populace because he failed to wave the white flag as tanks approached the town. He later killed his family and committed suicide. In Bretten-Baden, the Nazi burgomaster and all but all but one of his family committed suicide with the idea apparently of posing as martyrs to the Nazi cause.

The same report under the heading “Monuments, Fine Arts and Archives” states that seven direct hits by bombs were “scored” on the cathedrals at Cologne.

An interrogation report of a PW named Rudolf Rathke, a member of the Gestapo concerned with the detecting of illicit wireless and running DAs [*double agents*] is of rather special interest as it shows that the Gestapo did quite a lot of DA work with captured Russian agents. One of these controlled agents asked Moscow what he should do in the case of an allied invasion of France. The answer was that he should remain at his post.

During 1937–1938 the Russian Intelligence Service organised an espionage network in France, Belgium and Holland. The original mission of this network headed by an agent known under the cover name of General GILBERT, was to furnish information about political and economic trends in those countries. After the outbreak of World War 2 the entire system was transformed into a military intelligence network.

In November 1942 the Gestapo succeeded in raiding and arresting the entire network including GILBERT. This round-up started with the arrest of Hermann Wenzel, a Russian-trained radio operator who was operating a transmitting station in Belgium. Several minor agents were shot and among them a Russian woman

named Sokol who was shot in Brussels on the personal order of Himmler. Other agents were taken to Paris for further investigation.

Göring is said to have taken an interest in this organisation, and followed the disclosures with this illegitimate radio communication with Moscow and to turn the traffic into a Funkspiel. Most of the operators were to continue their transmissions under Gestapo control. This new set-up was known as *Rot[e] Kapelle* and was sub-divided into a Paris and Belgian branch.

All information transmitted to Moscow had to be passed by Abt. IV–A2B of the RSHA in Berlin. Most of the information was true as it was anticipated that the Russians would have opportunities for checking up. The transmission of military information, however, became more and more difficult owing to the un-cooperative attitude of the military authorities.

When in early 1944 one of the transmitters made a request for funds Moscow gave directions to contact a Czech citizen named Chervinka residing at Rue Edison in Brussels. Chervinka was married to a Russian woman who had a son employed at the Russian Embassy in Kabul. This son was allegedly supposed to furnish \$5,000 to be paid to Wenzel. The PW was ordered to impersonate Wenzel and to establish contact with Chervinka, but his repeated efforts to extract money from her met with no success. The station was known as WEIDE, and was closed down in February–March 1944, but for 3 months afterwards Moscow continued to call.

Another station known as TANNE was operated from Amsterdam by one Tino Winterink, a native of Arnhem. He and several others, among them a Dutchman named Nagel, were arrested by the

Gestapo in November 1942. Two others evaded capture. Owing to various bungles by the Gestapo, Moscow advised in March and April 1944 that the station should discontinue. They told the agent to join an active resistance group.

Another station known as BUCHE-PASCAL was operated by a Soviet army captain who in 1937 came to Belgium with a false Finnish passport using the cover name of Erich Jernstroem. This man broadcast alternatively from Liege and Brussels. He was induced in November 1942 to work for the Gestapo. When he asked for funds he was directed to a timber merchant in Charleroi who had an account of 50,000 French francs in Russia. Pascal was to ask for a loan bringing greetings from a Russian business friend. The merchant, however, remained indifferent and told Pascal that he had recovered his loss from an Italian insurance company and was not in a position to grant a loan.

Another station known as BUCHE-BOB opened in November 1942 and was operated by a Russian army officer. The officer was captured and shot as he refused to cooperate. The station however was taken over by another agent operating from Paris. It discontinued in mid July 1944.

In Paris GILBERT was induced to continue transmissions to Moscow but he succeeded in escaping in November or December 1943. The Gestapo are said to have found out that he had also been working for the British Intelligence in collaboration with a brother of the Belgian Minister Spaak. This station continued till the allied invasion. The Germans claimed that they obtained a considerable amount of money from the Russians and also information covering French resistance groups by infiltrating them with Gestapo agents. The codes used in these transmissions are on record.

SHAEF CI Summary of 27th April states that the HQ of the German military espionage service now seemed to have completed withdrawal into Bavaria, the main concentration being at Munich. It is perhaps noteworthy that no high officer of the RSHA has so far been captured and identified.

One unconfirmed report says that [Ernst] Kaltenbrunner has been superseded as head of the RSHA. Captured documents now prove that willing recruits for a stay-behind espionage organisation in Germany were difficult to find. This may explain the use of personnel of *kommand[os]* and *truppen* for agent work and of foreign worker cover for foreign collaborators originally intended for work outside Germany. In the political field a wave of unrest is passing over Belgium. Despite lack of encouragement from Russia, communists are fanning this unrest and jockeying for influential positions when war ceases. The position is regarded as potentially dangerous owing to the large number of arms dumps known to exist in Belgium and to others being smuggled into the country from France.

In Germany the work of CI teams has been affected by the speed of the advance. There have been difficulties of processing suspected persons and securing CI targets. There has also been a shortage of personnel to cover ever-increasing areas. Work has been facilitated however by the docile attitude of civilians. There is no evidence that any anti-Nazi movement is in existence in Germany or emerging. Activities of *Werewolf* organisations appear so far to be negligible.

We are threatened with the arrival of 3,500 interned and some 10–13,000 uninterned British subjects. Efforts are being made to set up a camp in order that we may elect the necessary screening. We shall only be able to look up those who are suspect and to check

the party against our list of renegades.

Bertram Ede looked in to know what had happened about the controversy over OC. I told him the position. He said that according to Charles the DG did not wish it discuss the matter until Findlater Stewart had given his findings. Bertram wondered whether we could agree that.

May 3, 1945: I went over to see C [. . .] We talked quite a lot about the Russians. He thinks that they are going to present us with tremendous problems and he is anxious to get ahead. At present his hands are somewhat tied. He is proposing to try and get some definite instructions from the Chiefs of Staff.

The moment may perhaps be opportune, as everyone is getting a bit tired of Russian behaviour, particularly the last move in setting up a provisional government in Austria. I told him what I thought about the possibilities of their trying to build a big Navy and to control the narrows in the Baltic and Mediterranean.

As regards the Baltic I referred him to the PANDORA telegram in which Ribbentrop had stated that Molotov had said on his last visit to Berlin [November 1940] that the control of Cattegat and Skagerack was a cardinal point in Soviet foreign policy. He had forgotten this and was extremely interested as he had been issuing strong warnings about the urgency of our getting to Lübeck and thereby controlling the Kiel Canal. He had done this on the basis of reports that the Germans were desperately anxious for us to seal off Denmark as they were expecting the Russians to drop parachutists in the area.

May 4, 1945: The war seems to be winding up and we are expecting V E Day probably on Monday. Everybody seems to be taking things

very quietly, including the assassination of Mussolini, the liquidation of Hitler, the surrender in Italy and the fall of Berlin.

The end of the war is falling rather flat, and V E Day is undoubtedly going to be a colossal bore, with no food and no transport. The only thing to do is to tie a Union Jack to the bedpost and go to bed[. . .] Verneuil [incidentally “not his real name”] is head of Travaux Ruraux and wants to set up an o2o in the French zone. We are sending him down to Oxford [where o2o was?? . . .] The old objection about o2o officers giving evidence, namely that it might lead to awkward revelations about the technique etc. at o2o has largely gone, but it would clearly be extremely inconvenient if not impossible for o2o or LRC officers to be travelling to various countries in Europe to give evidence[. . .]

May 5, 1945: Verneuil gave an interesting account of his experiences in working with the French resistance[. . .] The outbreak of war found him in Belgrade as MA. .[. . .] He knew at least 2 months before that the Germans were going to attack the Russians, and he told me that the Russians had given the Yugoslavs an undertaking that when they were attacked, before long they would come to their assistance. This seems to imply that even if they had not been attacked, the Russians would sooner or later have attacked the Germans.

[*Problems of the John Amery case. “DPP intends to prosecute him under the Treachery Act.”*]

May 14, 1945: Kremer and his mistress have been captured in Denmark and are being brought to UK. He will go to [Camp] o2o.

May 16, 1945: Kellar and I went over to see Canning and handed him a memo on Zionist organisations in Palestine and the possi-

bilities of an attempt by some terrorist to assassinate a prominent personage in this country. It seemed to us desirable that we should have the names of all Jewish seamen and civilians arriving here from the Mid East and if necessary we should obtain their particulars from Mid East. There was notification regarding seamen but a time lag of a week or 10 days existed and very often the man had left before we heard anything about it. We suggested that the ports should be asked to telephone direct to ourselves and S.B. [*Special Branch*]. I undertook to make the necessary arrangements with H.O. [*Home Office*.]

May 17, 1945: At the DG's request I spoke to [Victor] Cavendish-Bentinck about the proposal to bring Kaltenbrunner to this country. He did not seem very clear as to who Kaltenbrunner was, but saw no objection to his being housed at 020. His view was confirmed by Oliver Harvey, Eden's principal private secretary.[. . .]

I went to see C [. . .] I then showed him Wibroe's report on Danish relations with the Russians [. . .]. He reminded me however that the Germans have been desperately anxious for us to seal off Denmark by the occupation of Lübeck as they anticipated Russian parachute landings. In fact we only occupied Lübeck about three hours before the Russians arrived on the outskirts, when their tanks were told to withdraw. C thought the occupation of Bornholm was quite significant. He asked me to show Wibroe's note to Kim Philby[. . .]

I also told him about Kaltenbrunner. He told me that the cryptographers brought over here from Germany were no good and could now go back but there was another part who had been working on the atomic bomb who were to be brought over. [*The German atomic scientists were arrested and interned at Farm Hall in Cambridgeshire*].

May 18, 1945: [. . .] The DG talked to me about Kaltenbrunner. He seemed very annoyed with TAR [Robertson] for asking the field to send him back [to England] without prior reference to himself. I told him that I had seen Cavendish-Bentinck and had spoken to Oliver Harvey. The matter was clear from the FO point of view. I should be seeing Maxwell later[. . .]

I went to see Maxwell about Kaltenbrunner. He saw no difficulty in his being brought back to o20. He rather pertinently said that he did not think the Russians would consult us if they got hold of an important character in the SS and wanted to take him back to Moscow.[. . .]

I dined with Victor [Rothschild?] last night. He was full of his experiences at Wiesbaden and with 12th Army Group. He was instructing them in counter-sabotage work. He and Stuart Hampshire who was also there referred to the case of Nebel @ [aka] OSTRICH. Nebel was overrun and got back to Paris. They both thought that he was an extremely sinister figure and may well have double-crossed both the Germans and ourselves. He would however always remain at heart a Nazi and a thug. They both thought he ought to be bumped off and under certain conditions seemed to be quite prepared to do the job themselves.

Stuart gave an account of Dick [White?]'s visit to 21 A G [21st Army Group] who were evidently somewhat in disgrace for having allowed [Grossadmiral Karl] Dönitz to broadcast. The fact was that the Germans having surrendered refused to allow British troops free movement in their area, and persuaded 21 A G that they were the only people with the necessary administrative machinery to demobilise their forces,

When Dick arrived to enquire about the whereabouts of Himmler,

he found that the morale of Germans was quite high, that they were full of spit and polish, heel-clicking etc. and were generally taking up an arrogant attitude. When he asked about Himmler he was told that he had been in the area but that he had been told to get out and go south as he was an embarrassment to the military authorities. Dönitz and [Generaloberst Alfred] Jodl did not know of his present whereabouts. Some Panzer general took a great delight in showing off his tanks and made his latest models perform for Dick's edification. This may be a slightly libellous story but I hope to get a full account from Dick in due course.' [Not transcribed: Dick should remain in Germany until then beginning of August: see 25.5.45]

May 19, 1945: I went to see Newsam about the situation in Palestine and the possibility of terrorists coming to this country to assassinate the PM or some other high personage. I explained to him that we were anxious to speed up the information received at the ports about the arrival of Palestinian seamen and that we wished in future to have the notification of all Jews arriving from Mid East whether seamen or civilians. He gave me a note to PERKS and PRESTIGE, whom I subsequently saw at the Old Bailey. PERKS has laid on the necessary arrangement. We shall receive telephone notification direct from the ports.

[Not transcribed: capture of Otto Skorzeny and his assistant.]

May 21, 1945: I spoke to Brock about the checks on the Zionist agencies here, in Jerusalem and USA. There is always a certain risk with letter checks but it seemed to me that in this case it was one that should be taken. [3-4 lines blanked out. . .]

'Jane has produced an interesting report on ISCOT [Soviet-foreign communist party or Comintern intercepts?] and a short note of it

was given to the PM. She states

- (1) that the open activities of the Comintern ceased with its published dissolution on 15.5.43.
- (2) that the headquarter personnel, secret agents and clandestine communication system of the Comintern are still used by the Soviet Govt for the direction of Communist Parties abroad as instruments of Soviet foreign policy;
- (3) it was through this organisation that the Soviet Union gained control of the National Council of Poland, formed in Warsaw in 1943, engineered the transfer of its leading members to Moscow and formed there from the Polish National Committee of Liberation. The Committee moved to Lublin on 3.8.44 as soon as it became the provisional government of Poland.
- (4) the present Fatherland Front Govt of Bulgaria is the outcome of direct instructions from Moscow through the Central Committee of the Bulgarian C.P. in August 1944. The policy and tactics of the communist ministers is laid down by Moscow. Relations between Bulgarian and the Yugoslavian governments are regulated from Moscow through Soviet agents in Sofia and at Tito's headquarters.
- (5) In Yugoslavia Moscow has engineered to maintain control. It is carefully fostering a policy to drive a wedge between Tito and the British Government,
- (6) In Austria the Soviet Government through the same clandestine means maintains strict control over the Committee of the Austrian Freedom section in Carinthia and Styria. A spe-

cial emissary was sent to northern Slovenia in Oct 1944 with instructions for the formation of an Austrian battalion within the Yugoslav National Army, and with the formation of a committee for the Freedom Front. The personnel of the Committee are all either nominees of Moscow or non-communists appointed locally after consultation between special Soviet agents for the area and their control in Moscow. The formation of a provisional Government for Austria was laid down as a main plan in the programme of the C.P. of Austria which was printed at Slovene headquarters about June 1944. Franz Honner, appointed minister of the interior, is one of the two special agents who had been operating in northern Slovenia under Soviet instructions, while Johan Kopenik, minister without portfolio, was the Austrian representative in the Comintern up to its alleged dissolution in May 1943. The minister of Education, Ernst Fischer, was broadcasting regularly on Austrian matters over the Moscow radio up to April of this year.

May 24, 1945: Vesey told the 12 o'clock meeting about the case of a woman called Molkenteller, formerly of *Amt VI* in Berlin and captured in the field by the Americans. She said that while in Berlin she had been the recipient of photographs received from Ankara relating to information obtained from the British embassy.

She said that the Germans had recruited the embassy chauffeur and through him the Ambassador's valet, a Turk. The ambassador thought this man suitable (a) because he spoke no English and (b) because he had a good voice. The valet was given a Leica camera by the Germans and photographed all the documents he could lay his hands on. In fact he photographed some when the Ambassador was in the next room playing the piano. He thought this a

good plan as he had the necessary warning as soon as the piano stopped. The documents that he photographed were of considerable importance. They included some relating to the time and place of the Teheran conference, to the proceedings at the Conference, the plans for the attack on Rhodes, and to other Balkan plans (which had in fact appeared on the ISOS).

Lastly there was a document from the FO or SIS warning the Ambassador that there was a leakage of information from the Embassy. The effect of this last document had been that the valet was instructed to cease operations for a week. He recommenced after this period.

He finally left in the summer of 1944 and is now believed to be in Germany. He started operations in the autumn of 1943. I do not think that any incident during the whole war has caused me so much pleasure. C too his [*sic*] highly delighted. The DG is rubbing his hands. Herbert attended a meeting in Codrington's room with a representative of SID. Codrington was rather inclined to treat the whole incident light heartedly and made a very bad impression on Herbert. This is perhaps the most glaring example of the inefficiency of the FO Security organisation and the futility of sending out people like Johnny Dashwood to investigate cases of this kind.

May 25, 1945: ...delay in the demobilisation of these forces would have imposed an unnecessary burden on his own troops and would have delayed their demobilisation. SHAEF apparently take a different view and ordered the arrest of all the Generals, which took place the other day.

The news has come through that Himmler committed suicide under circumstances which are perhaps excusable and even desir-

able. His death will certainly save everyone a great deal of trouble.

I saw Stuart Hampshire for a moment. He has been at 12th AG, briefing the interrogators of Kaltenbrunner. He was not allowed to see K. neither has Victor been allowed to see Skorzeny. Victor of course is hopping mad. The Americans are pathetically ignorant but feel that as the man was captured in their zone they have got to put up a show. They are quite prepared to accept assistance in the matter of briefing which has been freely given. They have tried miking Skozeny and Kaltenbrunner together but both of them are clearly well aware of what is going on.

Very little has been extracted from Kaltenbrunner so far. He is taking the line that he is really a lawyer and politician, that he did not know anything about the atrocities committed under the orders of [Gestapo chief Heinrich] Müller. He has given a certain amount of political information which is true but is not being drawn into talking about the SD or the planning of the underground movement. In due course he is to come back here when we shall be rather put on our mettle.

The JIC are considering the establishment of the organisation to deal with the scientific and technical intelligence in the post-war period. Prof. [P M S] Blackett has written an interesting memo.

May 30, 1945: [. . .] many people are still being brought here who need not really come to this country at all. Quite a number arrive illegally on American aircraft. Only a very small percentage are of interest, though quite a few numbers have been collaborating with the Germans. We came to the conclusion that we wanted a camp to hold these people until they could be deported to their own country or some means [found] of preventing them from coming. We should still however require the require the Oratory

Schools. We are to discuss the whole question at the H.O. tomorrow.

Tommy Harris has got his OBE which will be a great source of pleasure to all.

Cavendish-Bentinck rang me up about the case of Carl von Loesch, who was formerly attaché to Ribbentrop's *Dienststelle* in this country. He has come into possession of the secret archives of the German F.O. They had been photographed and at the last moment it was decided to burn them. Von Loesch managed to bury them and the SD who were doing the job merely burned the empty boxes thinking they were burning the archives. The films are now in this country and Von Loesch's presence is required to elucidate them. He is by birth a British subject. I explained to Cavendish-Bentinck that if we once got him here we might not be able to get him out again and he might be an embarrassment. He is going to find out whether by virtue of his service in the German Army von Loesch loses his British nationality, or whether he would be liable to prosecution as a renegade. In actual facts we should not proceed against a character of the kind but his presence here might cause difficulties.

Keith came in to see me about the case of von Loesch. He asked me to let him know Cavendish-Bentinck's final decision. He told me that he had been up to Berlin for the signing of the armistice with [Field-Marshal Wilhelm] Keitel [Chef, OKW]. He had had to fish Keitel out of the dining room where he had been having a heavy lunch of caviar and champagne. He was not clear whether he had been lunching separately or with the Russians. The Russian Commissar haggled for about 3 hours over one word in the final document. Keith in his usual rather uppish way expressed some surprise at this. The Commissar replied "Russia has been fighting

Germany for 3 years and therefore three hours was a matter of no significance..” Keith replied “We have been fighting the Germans for 6 years and the sooner we get it over the better.” Kenneth Strong, I gather, was a little shocked by this remark.

At Flensburg there was an amusing interview with [Generaloberst Alfred] Jodl [Chef des Wehrmachtsführungsstabs]. We had issued to our troops an elaborate plan relating to their conduct in Germany and giving full details as to how the country was to be occupied and governed. The code name was to be occupied and governed. The code name for this plan was “ECLIPSE”. Jodl apparently opened the conversation by saying “I have read your plans ECLIPSE. I think it very good and I shall see that it is carried out to the letter.” A copy of the document has evidently been captured somewhere in the field. The joke of it was that Jodl had clearly read and studied it very carefully whereas our officers knew very little about it.

The French I gather are behaving extremely badly. Le Juin wrote such an insulting letter to Eisenhower, that he passed it on to the Chiefs of Staff in Washington. They decided immediately to stop all further lease lend for French rearmament. The French are constantly writing rude notes to the effect that they are now entirely in control of affairs in France and that the things about which we [. . .]

Courtney is apparently an unqualified success and has been made acting head of the War Room by common consent and approval. Unfortunately however he cannot be promoted and some figure head will have to be found. Dixon is suggested. I do not feel very enthusiastic about this proposal after his performance with COSSAC, but if Courtney was at his elbow he might be all right. Finney is to join the party as liaison with DIB. Relations with SIS

appear to be extremely good.

The Jap Minister in Berne seems to be very agitated about the future of Japan and is urgently counselling his Govt. to make peace and save what is possible out of the wreckage, otherwise he thinks Japan will inevitable go the way of Germany. He warns his Govt. against wishful thinking about allied designs.

According to SHAEF C.I. summary of the 27th May, the approximate totals of arrests reported to date are: GIS [German Intelligence service], including Gestapo, 1,636; SS and para-military, 1,087; police, including Kripo, 270; Party officials, 3,319; other officials, 196. According to Skorzeny, only in parts of northern Germany had there been time to establish any semblance of a Werewolf organisation. Screening of large numbers of P/Ws and displaced persons returning to France, Belgium and Holland has been handled superficially. Consequently the number of suspects and collaborators discovered has been small.

The final report on flying bombs and rockets indicates that there were 663 incidents due to rockets and 92 due to flying bombers during the first quarter of 1945. The rocket incident at Orpington on the 27th March was the last incident of its kind and the flying bomb attack on the 29th March was the last attack of any variety during the war. The cause of this was the allied invasion in Germany and Holland. On the 3rd March when activity was renewed after a pause, the Mark 2 flying bomb was used, apparently partly constructed of ply-wood and having an increased range, launched from landing bases in Holland. Most of these had radio-ranging apparatus.

During the whole period of the flying bomb attacks 9,251 bombs were reported in operation, 5,890 crossing our coats, 4,242 de-

stroyed. There were 2,420 incidents in London and 3,403 elsewhere.

Civilian casualties are reported as: London 5,375 fatal, 15,258 serious. Elsewhere 462 fatal and 1,504 serious. Service casualties were: London 207 fatal, 280 serious, elsewhere 95 fatal, 197 serious. The worst incident was at Wellington Barracks on 18th June 1944, where 58 fatal and 20 serious civilian casualties were caused and 63 fatal and 48 serious service casualties.

During the whole period of long-range rocket attacks, 1,112 rockets were reported, 517 falling on London, 537 elsewhere. on land, and 58 in the sea. Civilian casualties are reported as: London 2,511 fatal, 5,869 serious. Elsewhere 212 fatal and 575 serious. Service casualties were: London 30 fatal and 56 serious, elsewhere 1 fatal and 23 serious.

The worst incident was at New Cross Road, Deptford, on the 25th Nov. 1944, when 160 people were killed and 108 seriously injured. During the period 12th June 1944 to 29th March 1945, enemy action of all kinds caused the following house damage: London, 29,400 destroyed and 1,255,000 damaged. Elsewhere 2,202 destroyed and 165,000 damaged.

The JIC have issued a paper on our future conduct in relations with the Russians outside the diplomatic field. No longer is information to be given gratuitously. We are to say, as the Russians say, that the question will have to be referred to London. There will be a delay of several weeks at the end of which we shall say that provided the Russians are prepared to show us so and so, we shall be prepared to let them see similar equipment of ours. The same will apply to captured documents, German war plans, etc. etc. It is emphasized that only in this way can we command any respect. The present policy of just handing out information does us no

good whatever. It ends by our being treated with contempt.

I am going on leave tomorrow till June 17th [1945]

[*End of diary*]

