

PRO file KV4/187:

Liddell diary Oct 3, 1940 – May 3, 1941, CONTINUED

January 1, 1941: We have now obtained three more letters [about Admiral Muselier] from Collin who says that he has obtained them from the same source. They deal with a variety of matters and all incriminate Muselier. His Chief of Staff, a Lt. Villiers also seems to be involved. We can find nothing wrong with the text of the documents. Kenneth is giving them to Desmond Morton under the same safeguards.

At about 10 p.m. I was rung up at Tring by Harker. He said that the PM had given orders for the arrest of Muselier, Villiers and Mlle. D'Anjou. I offered to come up but he said he did not think this was necessary. He and Kenneth went to see Morton, when Kenneth once more emphasised our doubts about the source of the information. Morton said that the PM had given his order and there was nothing to be done but to carry it out. Col. Angenot was fetched and attempts were made to get hold of Gen. De Gaulle. He was away on leave and it was found impossible to get into touch with him. Angenot rather regretfully agreed to the action suggested. Although he thought that the documents bore the stamp of genuineness he would have liked Gen. de Gaulle to have

seen them before the arrests were made.

The Home Secretary was visited by Harker and Morton and gave the necessary orders to the police. Luckily we had already warned Canning during the afternoon that some action might be taken. In deference to Angenot's wishes no action was taken against Moret, Muselier's Chief of Staff, but at his request Mlle. Herincx was put on the list as it was thought that if there was any conspiracy by Muselier she would be the most likely person to have documents. The police took action during the course of the night. Mlle. D'Anjou was found in bed with Lisboa and Mlle. Herincx with a Dr. de Kerguelen. This is the first occasion on which they had slept together and it was his birthday. The police saw fit to bring in the doctor on the grounds of his association with Mlle. Herincx. Lisboa, hearing the police entering Mlle. D'Anjou's flat, thought that they had some blackout and hid in the lavatory. He eventually emerged and claimed diplomatic privileges. While he could not object to the flat being searched he refused to allow the police to touch any of his own clothes.

Villers could not be arrested till 8 a.m. as he was on night duty at the Free French headquarters, and it was found that the Admiral was down at Windsor spending the night with a lady friend. He eventually rolled up about 9 a.m. By way of precaution the police pulled in his valet and chauffeur. The Admiral protested mildly. He said he hoped the matter would soon be cleared up as it would create a very bad impression in the Free French Navy.

January 2, 1941: I interrogated Mlle. d'Anjou, but could get no change. She protested that she had never carried any letter from anybody connected with the Vichy Consulate or the Free French Forces to Lisboa. When I showed her the letter she seemed genuinely unable to interpret it.

January 3, 1941: I went down to Praewood this morning to discuss with VV what we should say to Clegg and Hince about the group messages. It was agreed that we should try and find out how much they knew before disclosing our hand. We had common ground to begin on since they had already had information about Group 10.

I saw de Gaulle at the FO at 4 p.m. He seemed very sore about the arrest of the Admiral. He began by saying that in his opinion the documents had been forged either by the British Intelligence, by his own Security Bureau or by the Vichy Consulate. He then put forward a number of points, none of which either Cadogan or I thought were in any way conclusive. They were in fact all very weak points. He eyed me with the gravest suspicion and at one moment hinted that the documents might have been forged by Kenneth, who was the only person who had seen the originals. I assured him that this was not so, and that he could rule the possibility out of his mind. I countered his points to some extent but owing to the obviously very tense situation I thought it was better not to criticise his judgement too strongly. He gave me the impression of being a very conceited man. At the conclusion of the meeting he asked what we were going to do. I said that we proposed to continue the enquiry. He said what was the use of continuing the enquiry if the documents were forgeries. We said that we thought it desirable that the case should be cleared up to the satisfaction of all concerned. He said that he proposed to see Sir Dudley Pound, tell him that he had interviewed Collin and that we were satisfied that the documents were forgeries, and ask for the Admiral's immediate release. Cadogan said he had a perfect right to do this if he wished.

In the evening I went through the Muselier papers at the Yard. There was nothing in them of any real consequence. Among his prop-

erty was an opium smoking outfit.

January 4, 1941: I saw Collin and his friend Stieglhember at Howard's flat. They had again to give an account of their doings the night before, when it was alleged that they had both been to the Brazilian Embassy and seem Gomez, whom they now stated to be Barboza, one of the Attaches. Stieglhember told me that he had waited on the ground floor while Collin had gone into Barboza's room. I asked him to give a description of Barboza which seemed to embarrass him rather. I then tackled Collin. He said that while Stieglhember had remained on the ground floor he had gone up to the 4th floor where he had seen Barboza. I then had Stieglhember and Collin in together. I said that one or other of them was obviously lying, and I wanted to know the truth. Stieglhember then confessed that in actual fact he had remained outside the Embassy and that he had lied to me because he had lied to Howard because he wanted to support his friend Collin in a story which he believed it be true.

This all seemed very unsatisfactory, and I went away with serious misgivings about the whole business. Admiral Dickens of the Spears Mission visited Muselier on Friday and thought that the prison conditions at Pentonville were very severe. It was therefore arranged that the Admiral should be removed to Brixton. He was visited there today by Gen. de Gaulle's A.D.C. Commander Collet, and Kenneth. The ADC told the Admiral that all would be well as the General was quite convinced that his arrest was due to "*un coup monté par les gens de Vichy à Londres*". The Admiral seemed in fairly good spirits.

January 5, 1941: Kenneth and I spent a long time getting out a report on the Muselier case up to date. The conclusions were that no evidence has been discovered among the papers of those ar-

rested in support of the documents, that nothing had been discovered which would seriously challenge the text of the document but that their origin was still in doubt.

January 7, 1941: GEORGE has returned from Lisbon with £800, a high-class transmitting set concealed in a gramophone and secret link in a specially made cigarette holder. He has a long story.

January 8, 1941: Collin was pulled in last night and has confessed that he forged the documents in the Muselier case. He says that he was inspired by Howard, with an idea of re-instating himself and giving the French Security Service a boost. He told us that when the first document was produced, dated September 5th, Howard had looked at it and then told him that it was no good as the things recorded did not fit in with the date. A few hours later he returned with an identical document dated August 5th. On this we decided to pull in Howard, who confessed that the two documents had been presented to him and that he had accepted the second one as being genuine and completely forgotten to inform us of the facts. I find it rather difficult to believe that either Collin or Howard would have had sufficient background to forge the text of the documents, and it is still possible that somebody else may be behind Collin. I find it difficult to believe that Howard is really a bad man. He had been reporting about Muselier and his entourage for some time and the whole business has become rather an obsession with him. I am inclined to think that when he saw the document, he could not or would not believe that it was not genuine.

Kenneth has a curious scene with Inspector Cain of S.B. who certainly behaves in a very odd way. He suddenly gets wild theories about a case, but in the end seems to get at the facts with fair efficiency. He got it into his head that Kenneth was withholding

some important information. In fact at one moment he thought Kenneth might have forged the documents. He started grilling him as if he were a pickpocket. Kenneth got rather annoyed about this and went for him. He then sent the two sergeants out of the room and asked him why he had got sore. Kenneth said that he was not accustomed to being talked to in that sort of way and thought it was time Cain got a slap in the eye. After this Cain very much changed his tune and smoothed it all over by taking Kenneth to dinner at the canteen. He then discovered that Kenneth had been in the office since 1936 and also been in control of a region since the beginning of the war. This was evidently rather a shock to him, K's youthful appearance had evidently misled Cain who thought he was a young pup just down from the University who knew nothing about anything.

Incidentally, an amusing incident occurred at the outset of the case, when Cain first interviewed Lisboa. The latter was very worried at the accusations, and hinted to Cain that as he was the official at the Embassy in charge of the issuing of decorations and orders, if Cain would lay off him he would see what he could do for him.

It emerged during Kenneth's conversation with Cain that the appointment of the CID men to our office had caused deep resentment among the officers of S.B. who felt that they had lost promotion in consequence. They thought that if we wanted police assistance it should have been drawn from S.B. and not CID Personally I think they are quite right. In fact it is exactly what we told Swinton and Cocker would happen. It will obviously take a long time before this sore is healed.

I attended a meeting of the JIC today to discuss the Twenty Committee. DNI had objected to the participation of Home Defence Executive, Home Forces, and Turner's organisation. Davidson the

new DMI took the chair and handled the matter very well. It was eventually agreed that all these departments would have to be represented. I had a number of questions on policy which were all dealt with by the D's of I. They said they were quite ready to take responsibility except in major cases where they thought they might have to consult their Chiefs of Staff. I really think that at last we have got the Twenty Committee on its feet. J.C. Masterman is an excellent chairman and I think we ought to have a very good show.

The question of the suppression of the CP [Communist Party] is under active discussion. Leggett thinks that both the *Daily Worker* and the Party should be dealt with and is supported in this by Bevin. Morrison thinks that only the D should be suppressed. I gather that he and Bevin do not get on. Leggett feels that the Trade Unions are losing their grip and that it is time something was done by the Government which will give them the support they need. Possibly he is right, but at the moment there is no serious dislocation due to Communist activity.

January 9, 1941: Spent the day between Scotland Yard and the FO on the Muselier Case. I first saw Eden and told him more or less what the position was. He wanted me to put up a note in conjunction with Strang, and Malkin the Legal Adviser, which he would show to the Prime Minister at 4 o'clock, He did not seem to be very concerned about it all, as the baby was obviously with the Prime Minister who would have to eat humble pie to de Gaulle.

I went back to the Yard where I had a long interview with Collin and also with Howard. Collin confessed to me the whole story. He did not implicate Howard beyond saying that he had on one occasion remarked that the only kind of information that was any good was a document. It was this that had given Collin his cue. He would not say that Howard had asked him to forge the

documents. Howard tells the same story but did not give a convincing explanation as to why he had not reported the alternative date on the first document. He insisted that he had had a complete lapse of memory. Strang and I and Malkin composed the document for the PM and Eden returned shortly after 4, saying that the Prime Minister had ordered the immediate release of all those arrested. I then went to see Morrison and explained the position to him. He said he would issue the necessary orders. He was slightly critical of our action, but understood the position when I explained that the documents had been put forward with the greatest reserve.

January 10, 1941: Morton tells me that the PM has given an order that the AG [Attorney General] is to enquire into the whole circumstances of the Muselier case and to consider a prosecution. [*See too entry for Jan 27, 1941, not copied: Liddell's resulting discussion with AG.*]

January 11, 1941: A German named Haushofer, in whom Curry was interested several years ago on account of his work on Geopolitik, has written to the Duke of Hamilton whom he knew personally several years ago. His letter dealt with family matters and concluded by saying how much he would like to see Hamilton if ever an opportunity arose, he said he could meet him anywhere on the continent. Hamilton is now a squadron leader in the Air Force. We have approached Archie Boyle who is prepared to send Hamilton on some mission to Lisbon. The whole case looks rather like a peace offer of some sort. [*It was, the beginnings of the Rudolf Hess mission. Hess had instructed Haushofer to send the letter.*]

January 13, 1941: I saw the AG today on the subject of the Muselier case. He was very pleasant about it all. I explained to him exactly how the case had arisen, that the action taken had not been on

our advice. We had in fact only presented the documents because there was no alternative and had emphasised the fact that the source was not verified. He went through de Gaulle's points with me, and agreed that there was very little in them one way or another.

January 13, 1941: It has finally been decided to go for the DW [*Daily Worker*] under Section 2d of DR [Defence Regulations] and subsequently under Section 94. Morrison has dug his toes in about the [Communist] Party.

January 14, 1941: Gilbert told me about the arrangements for the departure of [Lord] Halifax [for Washington to become ambassador]. Elaborate precautions have been taken by ISSB. Bogus luggage had been sent down to Liverpool which was to be placed on board the *Port Jackson*, and SNOW was asked to put over a message indicating that Halifax would be on this boat. When they got to Liverpool they found that the ship was not going to America at all, and the bogus luggage was thereupon transferred to the *Warwick Castle* with the necessary publicity. In actual fact Halifax is leaving on a cruiser from Scapa, and Winston, accompanied by a pack of journalists and half Wardour Street [the film company street] are going up to watch the incident and have it filmed. This is all by way of a publicity stunt for America. After all this was well under way, Gilbert was told that he was only one of seven people who knew about it all. He suggested that as Winston and the camera men were all going on a special train the Railway Executive, not to speak of the porters, must know all about it, apart from the other publicity in Fleet Street. This seemed to come as rather a surprise. It will be little short of a miracle if we don't lose the *Port Jackson*, the *Warwick Castle*, the cruiser and Halifax.

January 17, 1941: I attended the lunch at Claridge's given by Herschel

Johnson [US embassy] for Clegg and Hince. I had a talk with herself afterwards about WENNERGREN [sic. Axel Wenner Gren, *Swedish industrialist, Electrolux Co*]. He said that if I would give him a note he would send it over to Washington by [diplomatic] bag and make the suggestion that somebody should say something privately to the Duke [of Windsor, in the Bahamas.] He quite saw the point that a warning from that quarter might be more profitable than one from here. . . . Clegg has come clean about the Group 10 messages. He tells us that he has some thirty XX [double cross] agents placed in various factories and that he is feeding the Germans with misleading information. Contact between these 30 agents and the Germans is maintained by one courier who apparently brings the funds.

January 18, 1941: I saw Gwyer, who is a new recruit for B.2a. he is an intellectual type and... He is known to JC [Masterman] and should I think be useful to us.

January 19, 1941: The Sunday Express has come out with a blaze about the Government's proposals to deal with the CP. In actual fact they go further than the Government's intentions, which were to deal solely with the *Daily Worker*. Leakage seems to have been deliberate and will of course severely prejudice any chances of finding anything at the *Daily Worker* office, when they are raided tomorrow.

January 21, 1941: The Boothby Report has come out. The opinion of the committee is that his conduct was contrary to the normal usage and derogatory to his position as a member of the House. He has resigned from the Ministry of Supply but not from his constituency. He is going to make a vigorous defence.

January 23, 1941: I attended a meeting of the Twenty [*double cross*

planning] Committee when various schemes were discussed. We are to go ahead with Plan I, which is a scheme for getting the Germans to bomb a wood on the assumption that it is full of ammunition. We also discussed Stringer's plan for telling the Germans that all our troops are going to have some special identification mark in the event of invasion. The idea is that the Germans should use this identification mark and that we should not. The suggestion is being made to the Home Forces who have I gather already given a good deal of consideration to the problem. This is known as the BLUE BOOT PLAN, as Stringer's suggestion by way of illustrating his meaning had been to tell the Germans that all our troops would have their right boot painted blue, and that our troops should be issued with tins of blue paint to add conviction to the story.

January 30, 1941: I had a long talk with Cain about the Muselier case. I had seen Lennox previously. He had been asked to go round and have talk to Cain [sic] on certain aspects of the case. Cain's manner to Lennox had caused considerable annoyance. I don't think he means anything very much but he is undoubtedly somewhat of a megalomaniac. He has an unfortunate and somewhat offensive manner. This is now the experience of three of our officers, Kenneth, Derek Tangye, and Lennox.

February 1, 1941: Another parachutist has been dropped [*Josef Jakobs, later put on trial and executed*], with a wireless set and £500 somewhere I Huntingdonshire. He has broken his ankle. ...

February 2, 1941: The parachutist is at Brixton hospital. He says his name is Josef Jakobs, he says that he was in a concentration camp at Oranienburg, This may be true, but it is a story that we have heard before. He had with him £500. This is more than any of the other agents have brought. He had one address on him, that of

Mrs Lily Knips, 9 Compayne Gardens, NW7, reputedly a Jewess with whom Jakobs intended to communicate. Jakobs said that it was eventually his intention to go to America where he had an aunt.

[*A page of speculation and scepticism about Jakobs story.*] ... Jakobs has already agreed to assist us to make us of his wireless set.

February 3, 1941: I dined at Ham [Camp 020?]. Tineye [the commandant] put on a terrific show. Everything is run on a strict military basis and as far as I can see very efficiently... We had a long discussion afterwards (a) about methods for dealing more rapidly with parachutists, (b) about the bringing of prisoners to trial, (c) about a camp nearby for incurables, and (d) about the distribution of information obtained from ISOS messages. As regards (a), we decided that we should collect them direct from the local police station in our own van and bring them straight to Ham instead of Cannon-row. (b) It was agreed that VV and I should make representations to Swinton that bumping off should be the exception rather than the rule. We all felt that it was far preferable to keep these people as reference books since we never knew when they might be useful or when some further piece of information might turn up which would render interrogation desirable. (c) It was agreed that if a suitable site could be obtained a mile or two away it would be an excellent thing to have a camp for incurables constructed which could be directly under Tineye, as a kind of annex to Ham. (d) Felix agreed to let Tineye have the gist of all messages relevant to enquiries which he had in hand, but insisted that these should not be shown to the officer engaged in the interrogation, who might inadvertently give away information of importance.

February 5, 1941: [*About an ugly and violent Communist demo at the Savoy hotel on January 29, about which the Workers Challenge*

broadcasting station in USSR(?) broadcast an account at 8 pm on January 31: how had the Russians got it?] The complaint of the Communists is that the rich eat omelettes at the Savoy, while the poor can only buy one egg a fortnight if they can afford it.

February 5, 1941: Rather serious information has reached us from special material indicating that the Japanese here have instructions to treat all British subjects with extreme coldness and to be ready to make a hurried exit, I do not know what indications there are from other sources that the Japanese are likely to come in but it seems fairly clear that most of those here are strongly opposed to war. The same I believe applies to Japan where everybody is heartily sick of fighting.

SKOOT has returned with a long and interesting [German *Abwehr*] questionnaire. ... What is interesting is that he has been told to get his secret ink from GIRAFFE. Once more we come back to the family.

February 6, 1941: After the meeting I went on to the AG's office where I was introduced to the Commandant Cabanier. ... he explained that there were [sic. was] a number of features in the case which might very easily lead a Frenchman to think that the whole of the Muselier incident had been staged by the British. ... [*A whole page in this vein.*]

February 7, 1941: Spent the morning at home and then viewed the new offices. The accommodation is not bad but we are going to be rather cramped.

February 9, 1941: At Brighton. The PM made a fine speech, ending up with an appeal to the Americans, with the words, "Give us the tools, and we will finish the job." I was a little surprised that he

emphasized that he did not want men.

February 10, 1941: ... I lunched with DMI and gave him the latest about the activities of the XX Committee. He seemed interested and satisfied. We arranged for a meeting of the W. Committee tomorrow. Two friends of DMI's, highly placed officers in the Air Force, discussed with him the relevant [sic. relative?] importance of the various arms in the Air Force. DMI was interested in getting an increase in reconnaissance planes. This would mean a certain sacrifice, but only a small one, in the bomber programme. I gather that the PM had given orders that our bomber force should be rapidly increased for offensive action. [...]

Swinton came down this afternoon and enquired about the activities of the XX Committee. Dick [White] and JC [Masterman] had a long talk with him and he seemed satisfied. I spoke to him about the Home for Incurables and he is going to do his best to push this forward. I also discussed with him the question of bumping off agents. I said that from a purely intelligence point of view we were anxious to keep them as reference books, He suggested that VV and I should put up a case.

February 11, 1941: ... The Japanese Assistant MA [military attaché] Nakamo is obviously doing intelligence work, Special material shows that he is trying to get information about the movements of our ships to the China Seas and that for this purpose he has been in touch with some European. We are having kept under close observation and also putting [Lord] Sempill under observation. Japanese are very difficult to watch as to a European they all look alike and there is the additional difficulty of the blackout and 4 exits from the MA's office.

February 13, 1941: Harker has seen Maxwell, who agrees to the

proposition that all enemy agents captured should be brought to trial and that the final decision as to whether they are to be hanged should depend on how far they were prepared to assist us.

[...] Brigadier Hawes came to see me. He has instructions to form a Jewish Division. He was worried about the Revisionists. He was in close touch with Weitzmann [sic. Chaim Weizmann], who thought that the Jewish Agency should be entirely responsible for vetting those who joined the division. This is to be composed of Jews from all over the world. Weitzmann is also arranging for skilled Jewish technicians to come here from America. I told Hawes that I thought he would be well advised to leave the vetting in the hands of Weizmann, who was obviously interested in seeing that the division was a really good one. If the Revisionists were in any way responsible, undesirable people would creep in and the division would be used as a sort of political debating ground. I gather all the various departments of state are now concerned with the issue of some statement about the project. It will need very delicate wording if it is not to give offence to the Arabs. Although they maybe considerable advantages in the scheme both from the point of finance in America and technical skill, I cannot help feeling that politically it is a blunder, since the whole project will be used as propaganda against us both by the Arabs and by the enemy. It will moreover pin us down to granting concessions to the Jews in Palestine after the war. It is one of those things which are done in times of crisis and which are bitterly regretted afterwards.

February 16, 1941: A heard that a Heinkel 111 came down at one of our aerodromes a couple of nights ago in Norfolk. The pilot, being a little apprehensive as to his whereabouts, took off and came down at another aerodrome in Norfolk. On this occasion he got out of his machine and asked the Orderly Officer where he was. On being told, he got into his machine and flew off. The Orderly

Officer apparently did not question him or ask him where he had come from. A frightful row is going on in the Air Ministry about it.

[On leave February 22 – March 2, 1941]

March 3, 1941: David and Victor [Rothschild] have been down to a firm concerned in the manufacture of a new type of photo-electric shell. It should explode if it comes within 150 feet of its target. There is I gather another even more important development in the shape of an RDF shell which contains both a sending and receiving set.

March 4, 1941: I lunched with [Lord] Swinton today, in order to discuss with him certain troubles that we have been having with Gen. [Louis] Spears. Spears is of the opinion that we should eliminate all the supporters of Vichy from this country and for some time he has been trying to get our support for a move of this kind. We had told him that ... it was difficult for us to advocate a policy of internment or expulsion, particularly since it might be assumed that HMG were not anxious to offend them at this moment. It might I think well be argued that of the two, Vichy is more likely ultimately to be of use to us than de Gaulle. In this particular case Spears had forwarded certain documents that he had received from de Gaulle's forces. Kenneth Younger had replied giving an analysis of these

documents and saying that if the facts in them were found to be accurate something certainly ought to be done. He made two suggestions (1) that the FO should ask Chartier for an explanation and (2) that de Gaulle with his new powers should place the consulate out of bounds to all his troops and deal with those who contravened the order. For some unexplained reason this letter drew a most malicious reply from Spears who made it the occa-

sion for a general attack on MI5. He said that we might well be described as "The Innocents at Home" and that our motto should be "Hear no evil, see no evil, speak no evil". He then went on to say that we did not seem to have any conception of our duties. This would not have been so bad had he confined his remarks personally to us. Instead he gave his letter a very wide circulation including de Gaulle. We drafted a complete answer to all the points in his letter which we propose to send with a covering letter which we propose to send with a covering letter in which it is stated that Spears taken the trouble to make some enquiries a good many of his points could have been cleared up. We also remark that it seems extremely unfortunate that a copy of his letter should have gone to General de Gaulle since it could only make Younger's task more difficult than it is already. We hope therefore that he would see that our reply was given the same circulation as his letter. DSS did not feel that he could sign this letter and had asked me to confer with Swinton about it. Swinton entirely agreed with our reply and said that it was a departmental matter and should be signed by the DSS. Petrie to whom I also showed the documents at Swinton's request, agreed. I explained to Swinton what our difficulties had been with regard to the French, and admitted quite frankly that we had not been satisfied for a long time, with our French section, owing to lack of experienced officers. We had been obliged to let the thing drag on until we could get Kenneth Younger back. I explained that Kenneth was doing extremely well and that as far as I knew everybody with whom he came into contact agreed that he was very efficient and a very pleasant person to deal with. Spears had in fact expressed this view himself. It was therefore very extraordinary that he should have launched this sudden attack. Swinton agreed that Kenneth was a very efficient officer and very much regretted what had happened. He evidently does not think much of Spears' reliability. Swinton was very pleasant. He asked me if I liked Petrie. I replied that I liked him very much and that

I thought that he was a very straight person to deal with. Swinton agreed and said that he thought he was very strong. I infer that Petrie is going to take over.

[...] Baron [Franz von] Werra, the German airman who was a P/W here, has again escaped in Canada and succeeded in reaching the USA, he escaped twice in this country by digging himself out, and the second time he posed as a Polish airman. He succeeded in actually getting into a Spitfire and was being shown the controls etc when his identity was discovered. He was helped by the German consulate I USAA but was eventually caught by the American police. He has now I think jumped his bale [sic. bail] or parole. It is very important that he should not succeed in getting back to his own country as he undoubtedly has a good deal of information which would be useful. [*Werra did make it back to Germany, the subject of a famous film: The One Who Got Away.*]

SIS report that Wendel Wilkie told Dev that the US considered that in present circumstances the Irish insistence on the partition question was disproportionate and hardly worthy of consideration. This remark appears to have caused a deep impression on all those present who were careful not to take up the challenge. Willkie laid great stress on British courage and powers of endurance and said that he thought that if they held out another 5 months victory would be definitely assured. He tried to impress upon the members of the Eire Govt that their present neutrality was unreasonable and a false position from the American standpoint.

March 5, 1941: [General Louis] Spears is now trying to say that his letter attacking MIU5 was only sent to the FFF by mistake and that he recovered it without its being read by the latter. [... more detail]. It seems not unlikely that Spears is now trying to lie himself out of a rather awkward situation. [...]

Gambia Parry [sic] has taken over RSS. I very much hope that things may now get going. It will be necessary to see that our interests are safeguard and that the whole of the energies of the organisation are not devoted to ISOS messages.

Lennox came in this afternoon and gave me some kind of picture of what is going on. I gather that the abandonment of the island of Castellorizo in the Dodecanese was due to the misreading of a signal. The PM was evidently furious but no attempt is being made to retake the island at the moment. The parachute incident in Sicily may have been a partial success but nothing is really known. [more detail].

[...] Eden's visit was for the purpose of inspiring confidence in the Greeks who are short of ammunition and equipment and are threatening to come to terms with the Italians. He has promised them at least two Army Corps, which are now on their way. [...]

A signal has just been received from the Naval Officer commanding the Naval Expedition to the Lofoten Islands. The cod-liver oil factories have been completely destroyed and a certain number of German prisoners taken, and two or three hundred civilians who wish to join the Norwegian forces in this country. [...]

The diverting of 4 ships carrying iron ore from the Swedish mines has been another successful enterprise. I gather that by bribery or other means these ships were induced to sail to England instead of to Bremen. [...]

March 7, 1941: I saw Caroe. It has at last been arranged that he may join us as we have been given an increase in military establishment.

I also saw Derbyshire. I told him that for a long time I had not been satisfied with his work in B.4b. [...] I explained to him that the case of Lady Howard was extremely untidy when it reached me and that I had to get Hart to put it in some form which could be presented to the Home Office. [...] He wanted to continue dealing with Russian affairs and suggested that he might perhaps join up with Pilkington. I said that I wanted him to come up and do the Poles with Alley ...

Petrie has been officially appointed DSS and is to come in on Monday.

March 8, 1941: SIS are in a great state about the publication of a book [by Gribble] called *The Diary of a Staff Officer*, who in addition to criticizing the French and British Commands in rather an outspoken manner makes reference to work affecting the GC&CS. I communicated first with Mr Ray of Methuen's, the publisher, and then with Dick's [White's] brother who is a partner in the firm. 1,900 copies have already been issued and since further demands are being made by the booksellers, most of them must be in the hands of private individuals, meanwhile another 7,000 copies are in preparation and are to go out on Tuesday next. Dick's brother tells me that the book was submitted to the MoI and passed by all three service representatives before Xmas. I was then published serially in the USA. ... I am suggesting that the 7,000 copies should not be circulated and that the Censorship and D.4 should be warned against letting any of them out of the country. I feel that if we do more than this we shall only be drawing attention to what we are anxious to conceal. ...

[... I dined with Arthur Pollen. There was a heavy raid going on, the first serious one we have had for a long time. Several bombs

dropped near Onslow Gardens, including one I believe on or near Gloucester Rd Station. The Café de Paris was hit, and another one came down in Sloane St opposite the premises of the London Shoe Co.

I understand that Eden's mission to the Balkans is for the purpose of putting heart into the Greeks who were on the verge of breaking up, and also to get some assurance about Turkish intentions. It seems fairly certain that the Turks will fight, at any rate if their own possessions are threatened. Wavell has said that he is reasonably certain of being able to hold the Greek Peninsula. Strenuous efforts are being made by Eden to see the Regent and to induce Yugoslavia to come in at the back of the Italians in Albania. This would certainly be a master stroke if it could be pulled off. [...]

March 9, 1941: We have obtained through our Jap contact a copy of the PM's reply to Matsuoka of the 24th Feb. It is fairly strongly worded and concludes with the remark that it would be a matter of profoundest regret to HMG if by any circumstances Japan and this country were to become embroiled and this not only because of their recollection of the years during which the two countries were happily united in alliance but also because such a melancholy event would both spread and prolong the war without however in the opinion of HMG altering its conclusion.

March 10, 1941: I saw Stewart [Menzies?] and Hopkinson about the officer's diary. We ... thought that before coming to a definite conclusion it would be wise to see Gribble at the earliest possible moment. Stewart told me that there were indications that the Germans might be making some sort of move between 13th – 15th. He thought that if anything happened it would be ore likely to be in the nature of a raid than a serious invasion. His sources showed that the Germans were intending to make a drive down

to the Bosphorus and to go right through Turkey to the oil wells.

March 11, 1941: Stewart, Lennox and I saw Gribble at the WO. He admitted that he knew the messages came from a very secret source but he thought that he was amply covered by having submitted his diary for censorship. He admitted however that he had shown the document

Previously to his agent to see whether its contents were like[ly] to interest the public if they were published in book form. It was explained to him that certain passages constituted a grave indiscretion and that it was in the public interest that he should cooperate with us in doing anything possible to pick up the pieces. We eventually agreed that even though the offending passages had appeared in the *Saturday Evening Post* it would be better to issue the new edition in amended form. Gribble was to tell his agent that he wished to make certain amendments in the text and therefore he would like the return of the proof copy from America before any further action is taken. As regards the *Manchester Evening News*, who were asking permission to publish the book in serial form, it was decided to see first whether they were prooosing to exclude the offending passafes. [...]

I lunched afterwards with Stewart. He told me that his own sources had reported most accurately almost every move in the Balkans and that all his information had been confirmed in a most remarkable way by F.J. [not explained]. I gather that further progress has been made by F.J. in the naval sphere. Information had been received that the Italians were likely to abandon Massawa very shortly. The rendezvous for their ships is known and the Navy ought to have a good chance of getting at them.

SO2 have been giving a great deal of trouble. They act in a very slipshod and indiscreet manner . The result is that all their people

get rounded up and some of Stewart's as well. This I gather is what has been happening in the Balkans.

In the afternoon Dick's brother came down and we discussed details about Gribble's book. It was apparent that if the offending page was taken out it would be quite clear that a new one had been gummed in. We therefore decided to buy up the whole of the second edition which was already bound and have arranged that the offending page in the other two editions should be removed altogether, with those which were joined to it. [...]

March 12, 1941: ... I showed him [the DG] the case of Jehovah's Witnesses which had started at the Centre on a press cutting and resulting no less than eight Govt. Depts. Being communicated with. ... DG has put up a very masterly note on the unfortunate case of Thiebault.

March 13, 1941: The Nora Briscoe case is developing. M is introducing a German agent and there is to be a meeting when he will get the documents.

This case was first brought to my notice on Saturday. One of M's agents was asked to tea with Molly Hiscox, where he met Nora Briscoe, who is the wife or mistress of Jock Houston, the interned member of the BUF. Briscoe said that she was working in quite an important section of the Ministry of Supply and that she had been copying all documents which she thought would be of interest. She is of German origin and has a son who is being brought up in Germany. She is now looking for some means of getting the documents through to the Germans.

March 15, 1941: ... Nora Briscoe has been pulled in with all the documents. The meeting room was miked and M and SB were in an

adjacent room listening in. It was clear that important documents were being discussed and M came to the conclusion that action should be taken immediately.

[... Armstrong, the AID Inspector who communicated with the German consul in Boston, is being charged here under the Treachery Act.

March 16, 1941: Spent most of today visiting GP in the country. Dick [White], Frost, and [Felix] Cowgill and I discussed with him the future of RSS. It was agreed that GP should set up two Y masts and retain a limited number of skilled VIs. At present there were some 450, many of whom were useless and could be returned to store, He would have expert personnel with his Y masts who would know the ether and be in a position to eliminate anything but the suspicious traffic. Any communications which were thought to be peculiar would be sent to the W Analysis Committee and would be co-related with any information that either we or SID might have. Messages would then come to the GC&CS and the decodes would be co-related and distributed by Cowgill's organisation. GP's organisation would only be responsible for sifting in the first instance genuine traffic from the suspicious.

March 17, 1941: Lunched with M. He told me all about the Briscoe case and showed me the documents. They are voluminous and cover a wide field. If the information had leaked it would certainly be a very serious matter. They relate to the location of factories, shortage of materials, establishment of submarine bases in N Ireland, etc.

March 19, 1941: Briscoe and Hiscox have been remanded and have been charged preliminarily under Section 2(a)1 of DR and also

under the Treachery Act.

March 20, 1941: I saw [Kim] Philby this morning. Burt [of Scotland Yard] explained to him the result of his conversation with Gurrin, the handwriting expert. Gurrin says that he would be much more confident about identifying a typewriter which had been used to type certain documents than he would be in identifying handwriting. [...]

Enquiry shows that in the Briscoe case we were consulted by the Ministry of Supply about this woman's employment on January 31, 1941 but that they had already taken her on on January 20, 1941. We replied that she had German and Fascist associations and we did not think her appointment was desirable. This case should be a lesson to other departments.

March 21, 1941: We have just captured Krechmar [Kretschmer?], the German ace submarine commander. A member of his crew says that the other submarine ace [Günther] Prien is some eight weeks overdue and it is thought that his submarine had been sunk.

A extensive raid on the coast of France which we thought would have taken place on the night of 19th-20th was called off at the last moment by the PM. He did not think that the operation was big enough. This has been a great disappointment to the troops who were very keen and thoroughly keyed-up.

March 22, 1941: There has been some rather disquieting news about SNOW. It seems that the Germans were not satisfied with his traffic and went for him. He evidently felt himself cornered and admitted that he had been operating under duress. In spite of this he alleges that he has been given a sum of £10,000 and a new contract. This seems very curious but there is no chance of get-

ting at the facts until he returns. [... *more detail*].

[...] There is rather reassuring news about TRICYCLE (Skoot). He is to come here on a special mission instead of going to America.
...

I was rung up by the night duty officer who had received a report from the PM's secretary that aerial photographs taken at Chequers revealed some kind of suspicious ground signalling. I have arranged for Con to go down to Chequers in the morning. I seem to remember that we had a similar incident at the beginning of the war when it was suggested that the ground had been ploughed up in a peculiar way. The whole thing turned out to be a mare's nest.

March 27, 1941: I visited Fighter Command and was taken over by W/C Coope and F/L Spencer. I also had a talk with Air Vice Marshal Evill. I explained to him more or less that our interest was in getting information about operations by German planes over this country, particularly at night. [... *Lengthy 6pp description of the semi-circular underground Filter Room, with maps, etc. and the somewhat quieter Control Room; and of the Lorenz blind landing system used by Luftwaffe and RAF*]

March 28, 1941: There have also been developments in the Armstrong case. He is the AUD inspector who communicated with the German consul in Boston. He appears to have told a fellow prisoner who was being released that he could arrange for the necessary travel documents to the USA through a certain "Queenie" who had a café in Bute St. Cardiff.

SNOW and CELERY arrived back yesterday by air, with £10,000 and explosives concealed in shaving soap, an electric torch and in a

fountain pen and pencil. Their stories will need a lot of sifting.

March 29, 1941: I saw the DNI in regard to a BJ which denoted leakage of information to the Japs by some contact on the subject of the *Asaka Maru*. The Japs have turned this ship into a naval warship in order that it could go through the contraband control. Negotiations have been going on and some contact of the Jap Embassy who is also in touch with somebody in the Admiralty had given away information about our intentions. I suggested [Lord] Sempill was a possible, and said that the case should be fairly clear if the Admiralty made enquiries within their office. DNI took this opportunity to discuss the question of Sempill. He is evidently rather worried and wants if possible to get the matter finally cleared up.

The move to the new office has started.

March 31, 1941: Started in the new office. It is fighting cold. DG interviewed nearly all the officers of W [Wandsworth?] in my presence. He wanted to know exactly what they were all doing and what their views were about the organisation,. This had come about I think owing to my having told him that there was a good deal of discontent and lack of confidence in Frost. It seemed in fact probable that if Frost stayed a good many of them would leave. [...]

The naval battle which developed in the eastern Mediterranean seems to have been very successful. We have sunk three Italian cruisers and two destroyers and seriously damaged a battleship of the *Littoria* class. Our casualties have been nil. [See April 3].

April 1, 1941: We have just heard that a Dutchman called J Willem

ter Braak has been found dead in a shelter at Cambridge, He had evidently shot himself and had been dead some 36 hours. His Dutch papers were out of order and did not show any authority to land. He had lived in Cambridge for about 4 months. He had arrived about 4th November with a small suitcase and a parcel. He had a brand new registration card. On form, I should say he was undoubtedly a parachutist, and probably one whom we expected at about that time.

April 3, 1941: We have now got some definite information about ter Braak. There is no doubt that he was the parachutist who was reported to have come down near Bletchley. We have obtained his wireless set which was in the cloak-room of Cambridge railway station. the joke of it is that in spite of our instructions to the police etc. Ter Braak has been living within fifty yards of our RSLO in Cambridge. it seems that his landlady did not report his presence to the local police who merely said that they expected he would register before long. The man had been trying to get a ration book; having run out of food and money he presumably decided to shoot himself. ...

Lennox tells me that the German offensive against Greece is expected to start on Saturday. ... All the propaganda in the Press about the Mediterranean Battle and the means by which we made contact with the enemy is a blind to cover up the real source of the information.

April 5, 1941: I attended a meeting of the W Committee in the morning. TAR [Robertson] and JC [Masterman] were present. The principle subject of discussion was the case of SNOW and CELERY. JC gave a mastery exposition of the case. [*Follows in detail, 1 page*]

April 6, 1941: ... The following is an interesting account of an inter-

view with De Valera which took place about March 23, 1941:

“I was with him about half an hour. He was very courteous and talked about restraint. He is undoubtedly extremely worried about Eire’s lack of defences and pointed out how vulnerable to air attack were Dublin and Cork. He said that Churchill didn’t want the ports so much as the land behind them on which to establish air bases; that the Irish people would never stand for British troops entering the country because they would never believe they would leave again after the war and that he doubted that he would be able to convince them that they had not come to stay. He deplored the “lack of trust between the Irish and the English”, said that Churchill could clear away the distrust at once by making “a public statement that under no circumstances whatsoever would British troops enter Eire except on his (De Valera’s) direct invitation”. He said that in case of a German invasion of the South there would undoubtedly be scrapping on the Border if the troops from the North attempted to come over the Border except on his invitation; he would not admit that in the case of an invitation he would ask for help from the North. He talked at great length on the subject of the partition of the North and South and said that this question must always prevent any real friendliness between the Irish and the English. He produced a map on which he has shaded off the Northern Counties anxious to be (according to him) united with the South and under one Government; the only part left white was a very small area around Belfast. I asked him what he would do if America came into the war, and he said “I can only repeat to you that I am determined to maintain the neutrality of my unprotected country to the very best of my ability”. He gives one the impression of an extremely worried man in a bad jam and determine not to admit it.

I had luncheon with Joe Walsh in his house the day before the in-

terview (which incidentally Walsh arranged) with De Valera, John Betjeman, Sir John Maffey's Press Attaché, was the only other person at this luncheon.

Walsh did all the talking which was chiefly on such subjects as Irish art and literature, and the efforts which he said were not succeeding very well, to revive the Irish language. He repeated several times that the great majority of Irishmen were definitely anti-German, thought Britain would win the war and wanted her to do so because of not wanting to be dominated by the Germans. But that any of them could not forget the past injustices and [...]

April 7, 1941: [Sir Oswald] Mosley is proposing to bring an action against the Govt, for wrongful detention and in the meantime wants to have confidential access to his solicitor,. Picker and I discussed this with the DG when it was decided that Pilcher should see the Attorney first and find out whether there was any possibility of the action being heard. This would seem to be a real challenge to the whole of the DR. The real trouble is that the conditions at Brixton are not suitable for the detention of political offenders. Mosley has sworn affidavits about the food, the Washington facilities, etc.

[...] Ll. G [Lloyd-George] appears to be talking in a very defeatist way. He thinks it is useless to go on with the war, that an out and out victory is impossible and that an early move should be made towards a negotiated peace.

April 8, 1941: SOE have asked whether we can supply them with Princess [Stephanie von] Hohenlohe's letters for publication in America. They apparently want to help out one of their contacts

there. I have said that I think it is extremely undesirable since Hohenlohe might well retaliate by the publication of Rothermere's letters which he wrote to Hitler, and also Hitler's replies [*David Irving notes: these are in the Hoover Library's collection of Hohenlohe papers*].

April 10, 1941: Dick [White, [TAR [Robertson, JC [Masterman], Marriott and myself had a long discussion about SNOW and CELERY. It was agreed that the only safe course was to assume that the Doctor knew about our controlled agents and that he probably knew as much about it as SNOW or CELERY. [... *Long details*] TATE in the meantime will go over with renewed and urgent requests for money. [two more pages]. The future control of SNOW and CELERY was not finally decided on. There was general agreement that they would have to be kept under close supervision and that it might be necessary to shut SNOW up or alternatively to remove him from the country. [...] Dick felt confident that Rantzau knew that both SNOW and CELERY were under the control of the British Intelligence Service, but that he had decided to use both of them as agents against this country. ... It was curiously noticeable that in spite of the unpleasant things that SNOW and CELERY had said about each other [*when interrogated separately*] they did not embark on any serious recriminations [*when confronted with each other*] and in the end seemed quite ready to go on working together.

DNI is employing [*astrologer*] Louis de Wohl to read the horoscopes of the most important Admirals in the Navy, and also those of Hitler, Mussolini, Darlan and [Sir Charles] Portal [Chief of Air Staff], Merritt of NID is his intermediary. It is believed that DNI himself is a strong believer in astrology. On the other hand it may be that since Hitler works on these lines and de Wohl is acquainted with the methods of Hitler's astrologer, DNI hopes to work out

I saw Medhurst [Air Ministry]. He promised to make the necessary arrangements, to see that the aeroplane was not attacked in the particular area where it is proposed to drop the money.

April 21, 1941: MUTT and JEFF are now established in the villa at Hendon, where they have succeeded in establishing contact. Generally speaking we are more satisfied about their bona fides but personally I feel that JEFF has rather too much German background to enable us ever to regard him as reliable.

April 22, 1941: [*Half a page, a paragraph of some 15 lines has been blanked out, no indication what the subject was.*]

Tripoli has been heavily bombarded from the sea. Some 3,000 tons of shell[s] have been put into the town. We have one brigade in Iraq.

April 26, 1941: The Germans are arranging for someone to come over and give TATE is money. This man I described as the "man from the Phoenix in Hamburg." We intend to arrest both him and TATE. Elaborate precautions to effect the arrest are being planned.

[...] I saw Lennox today. He tells me that we are evacuating Greece tonight. ... The [German] invasion of Spain is expected within the next two weeks. [...] ... it is not thought that we can hold Gib indefinitely. Operations to counteract this disadvantage have been planned.

April 28, 1941: DG and I visited the Censorship, where Admiral Sturdee showed us over the telegraphic branch. Herbert again emphasized the importance of getting originals quickly released.

April 29, 1941: We had a director's meeting at which plans during a possible invasion were discussed. Divisions were asked to give some estimate of the number of people they considered to be essential to the working of the office at such a time.

[...] I saw [John Gilbert] Winant [US ambassador] in the afternoon. He was worried about a letter I had written concerning an American citizen named Florence F. who is an American professor of somewhat left-wing and pacifist views, is doing research work at Birmingham University and asked for a permit to visit a protected area in order to carry out certain work he was doing for the Ambassador. I had therefore written to the Embassy asking if this was true and if so whether the Ambassador thought it necessary for F to move about in protected areas in order to carry out his work. The Ambassador told me that he had known F for many years, that he had been pacifist in the last war but he was anything but a pacifist in this. He assured me that he was thoroughly pro-British at heart. Winant was extremely pleasant but a little shy at first. He look like an intellectual and talks very quietly, so quietly that at times I could hardly hear him. We talked quite a lot about Russia and about communists. He thought we had mishandled the Russian planes in Czechoslovakia aerodromes after Munich and he thought that if we had gone all out to get Russia's cooperation then she might have come in on our side in the present struggle. I said that the presence of these planes in Czechoslovakia were certainly difficult to explain. I did think that they might have given certain technical aid to Czechoslovakia had a war been started at the time of Munich but I doubted whether this would have gone very far. Personally I regarded Russia as being entirely cynical in the present struggle. She had started the European war knowing exactly what he was doing and she had been in fairly close relations with the Germans ever since 1923, on all matters affecting armaments and intelligence. Her present policy seemed

to be based on a desire to preserve the integrity of the Soviet Union and with this object to avoid a clash with Germany. I thought also that he had a long-term view of seeing Germany and the British Empire exhaust themselves after which she would resume an active world revolutionary policy. I knew I was unorthodox but I strongly believed that the idea of world revolution still held a place in Soviet policy. Winant disagreed about the Third International. He thought that we had always exaggerated its significance in relation to the communist movement in this country. I explained to him that while these may have been the views of certain die-hard politicians they had not been the views of the Government. He had always maintained that continued legality of the party acted as a useful safety valve. It brought to light certain genuine grievances which were admittedly put forward for purely political ends and so caused the Labour leaders and ultimately the National or Conservative Government to pass social legislation. Progress had been achieved in this way over a period of 20 years, although things moved slower than some people wished. I felt that if they were forced to move quicker there might very easily be a swing of the pendulum in the other direction. He entirely agreed with this. During the whole discussion which was somewhat lengthy, Winant's secretary kept on coming in to announce another appointment. Winant forced him each time to retire. Eventually I got up and said that I could see if I did not leave he would be getting into serious trouble with his secretary. We parted on a very friendly note and he asked me to come and see him again or to lunch with him. He has a very pleasant personality, has travelled a great deal, and is extremely interested in all social and political problems. I should imagine that he might on occasions get rather carried away by his enthusiasms, and by his fair-mindedness.

Sir Hans Visscher called in the morning and was seen by DG and

myself. He is leaving by air for West Africa tomorrow and will report on the situation to us and MI6 as soon as possible.

[...] We lost altogether 20 ships in the port of Piraeus. The Germans have shot 20 of de Gaulle's men captured in Libya. The Prime Minister has ordered that the next 20 Germans captured by us are to be handed over to de Gaulle. There is a certain amount of anxiety about an attack by air-borne troops on Syria. America is asking Vichy to stand firm in Syria.

April 30, 1941: I discussed the case of del Campo with the DG. De Campo is a self-confessed German agent of Cuban origin who came here from Spain and has been interned. We are getting a reliable Republican Spaniard to impersonate him and go to the Spanish Consul at Newcastle with a request for assistance. [*There follow details of a complicated plan to entrap the pro-German Spanish consul in Newcastle who was known to be sending reports to Serrano Suñer about air raid damage, shipping conditions etc.*]

May 1, 1941: [*Of possible Rudolf Hess relevance?*] I had a meeting in the evening with DG, Col. Thornton, Lakin and Airy on the preparations for a special operation, which is contemplated in the near future. Airy is going up to Glasgow to deal with the Censorship material and to coordinate it with the RSALO and the SCO. In the meantime ISSB are sending up Major Cass to look after the security of the various units and to make contact with the SCO and possibly also the RSLO. There is obvious duplication here but I hope that our respective functions will be defined at the meeting with the services which is to take place shortly.

Lennox tells me that 43,000 out of 56,000 have got out of Greece. 500 were saved from the torpedoed transport which was carrying 1,000.

May 2, 1941: The CP [Communist Party] have told their district organizers that the Greek and Yugoslav wars are just wars and must not be regarded as imperialistic wars. It is difficult to understand quite what this means, unless it is an indication that Russia is getting really frightened about Germany's action.

I lunched with Herschel Johnson [US embassy]. I warned him that Gerothwohl was getting information from [Francis] Biddle [US attorney general]. I also told him about Scanlon's association with Artaza, the Spanish consul in Newcastle. As regards the latter I said we were particularly anxious that no sort of indication should be given to Artaza that we regarded him with suspicion. Lastly I told him that one of Mr [Averell] Harriman's commission, a I think a Col. Green, was shortly to receive a visit from Gen. [J F C] Fuller and I thought it advisable that Green should know about Fuller, although the purpose of the meeting was probably only to get Fuller's view about tanks and mechanized warfare.

May 6, 1941: Ll. G. has changed his views again. Several months ago he was all in favour of a negotiated peace, He still feels that we cannot win the war and that most we can hope for is a stalemate and in view of our recent reverses he no longer thinks that them moment is opportune for peace negotiations. He thinks therefore that we should speed up our war effort to the maximum and that having achieved a few successes we should then come to terms with the Germans. He is surrounded by a group who to some extent hold the same views as himself. The principal people are Horrabin, [Leslie] Hore-Belisha, and Wardlaw-Milne. The whole group consists of about ten people. They are leading the attack on the government in the House today. No personal attack on Winston is contemplated. Ll. G's ultimate object is to get into the Cabinet on his terms. An offer was made to him some time ago

but he would not go in as he felt that his hands would be tied. He would only join the Government if he is to be the big noise on policy.

May 7, 1941: SNOW remains interned and so far has not asked to see anyone. There is a proposal to send CELERY to Lisbon to see if he can induce a German agent called Sessler to sell out. RAINBOW is angling for a full time job but so far the Germans have not bitten. He has received no pay since January. TRICYCLE arrived back at the end of last month and continues to give the same very favourable impression. The Germans have swallowed his deputy BALLOON and also FRIEDEL, with whom we hope to open up new liens. [*and more of the same.*]

[...] Mrs Nicholson has been acquitted in spite of the fact that she admitted that she had made notes from the cipher telegrams which she had received from Anna Wolkoff. Her husband went into the box and admitted that he had also taken notes. Their excuse was that they thought the PM was conducting some intrigue with Roosevelt and that the matter might be of importance from the national point of view. Patrick Hastings [QC] made a clever move in putting the husband into the box and bamboozled the jury into thinking that a British Admiral could not possibly commit and act of treachery and that therefore his wife must be innocent. The Solicitor General regards the case as one of the worst miscarriages of justice that he has known since he was at the Bar. The question now arises as to whether Mrs N should remain interned under [Defence Regulation] 18b. The probability is that she will be brought before the Advisory Committee.

May 8, 1941: One of M's people came to see me today about the case of one John Manifold, a lieutenant who has succeeded in getting into MI8. He is a Communist and intimately connected with the

headquarters of the party. Lennox is making enquiries about him, but I gather the WO are anxious to get him transferred elsewhere as soon as possible.

May 9, 1941: Lennox tells me that the Germans are massing for an attack on Crete. The Navy know about this and are quite pleased, as the attack is to take place by sea and not by airborne troops [sic.] They hope to have plenty of warning. Portugal is said to be full of German tourists. ...

May 10, 1941: We have bought 2 bloodhounds and their keeper They will be available to all regions for tracking down parachutists.

[...] Lennox tells me that a trawler has been intercepted somewhere in the vicinity of Iceland. It has been brought in with its crew and it is reported that it has on board the ENIGMA cypher. A notification has been made to the press that the trawler was sunk by that members of the crew were saved,. This may save any alteration in the cypher which might prevent us from cracking it up. The trawler was engaged in making meteorological reports.

May 11, 1941: There was a heavy raid on London last night, and two bombs fell on either side of the office. ... 33 enemy planes were brought down by night fighters. The moon was full and conditions were ideal.

May 12, 1941: ... Lt. Manifold was hit by a bomb on Sat., night and is temporarily laid out. This disposes of our difficulties at the moment.

... Had lunch with Frost, when we discussed the case of W. We agreed provisionally that ... the Holorith [sic. Hollerith] should remain in London under B.2 ...

May 13, 1941: Today's sensational news is the arrival of Rudolf Hess in a Me.110. He apparently landed near Glasgow on the night of the 10th. Kirkpatrick of the FO has definitely identified him. He has a broken ankle and is in hospital in Glasgow in charge of the military. He seems to have been carrying some sort of message to the Duke of Hamilton from Haushofer. We knew about Haushofer before the war. His great subject is Geopolitik. He has written to the Duke immediately after the outbreak of war and had sent him another letter last Sept. saying that if there was ever a chance of seeing the Duke he could come to Lisbon. This letter was sent to a cover address and enquiries were started on the assumption that the Duke's bona fides might be in question. As these led to nothing it was suggested to the AM [Air Ministry] that they should get him up and suggested that possibly he might go to Lisbon in some official capacity. There was a good deal of delay and eventually the ANM produced his brother. After further delay they got hold of the Duke himself. He explained that he had known Haushofer for some time and expressed his willingness to go to Lisbon if a suitable cover could be found. The AM eventually decided that it would probably be better not to send him at the present moment. It is difficult to say what Hess's motive is in coming here. He has probably fallen out with the [Nazi] party on what he regards as a fundamental issue. He may resent the approach to Russia as he was violently anti-Communist and become embroiled in some kind of intrigue. Possibly his life was in danger and he decided to escape. Alternatively he may have come over with some kind of peace offer. The Germans may have thought they could convince us of their sincerity by sending a man of high standing.

The [German] statement in the press about Hess being mad would merely have been put over to cover up the fact that the Germans are putting out peace feelers. Personally I doubt this hypothesis

very much. It seems to me to far fetched.

May 14, 1941: I saw [Lord] Swinton yesterday, he told me that Hess's story was that he was still an admirer of the Führer but that he was appalled by the slaughter and destruction and wanted to see if there was not some way of stopping it.

[...] A strong attack on Crete by [German] airborne troops and by sea is anticipated, The French have allowed two trainloads of ammunition to go to Iraq from Syria.

I saw [Sir Walter] Monckton and explained to him our point of view about Hess. I thought that it was highly necessary that we should be kept informed of what he was saying and that there should be some record of the conversations of the people who visited him and of their impressions. I realized that the whole business was on a very high plane. At the same time we had a very definite interest, since Hess was nominally in control of the SS [security service] organisation known as the Innere Dienst. A occasion might arise when the conversation could be led on to this ground,. Monckton said that he quite understood our point of view and that he would make arrangements for me to see Kirkpatrick as soon as he returned.

May 15, 1941: The man from the Phoenix who was to bring TATE his money has been picked up by a War Reserve policeman at Colney. He was asking his way to the nearest hospital,. The policeman suspected him and on finding his papers were not in order took him to the nearest police station. Here he was searched and a sum of £500 and \$1,400 was found on him. The Supt. having had his instructions from our RSLO about suspicious persons carrying large sums of money immediately came the conclusion that the man was a spy. On being questioned, he said that his name was

Richter that he had landed in a boat 10 miles west of Cromer on the previous night and was making his way to the Regent Palace Hotel [*in London*] where had a rendezvous with an unknown person outside the barbers shop. he was to hand over to this person the sum of £450. He had undertaken this work as he was formerly in a concentration camp and saw a chance of getting away to America.

May 18, 1941: [Note the irritability of Liddell that MI5 is being excluded from the Hess affair]. I saw Hopkinson and explained our point of view about Hess. He said that the matter was still on a very high plane and that Hess was not in the mood to discuss matters on our level. He told me that so far only Hamilton and Kirkpatrick had seen him. I asked him about microphones, as I thought that a record of his conversations might be interesting, particularly if some of the appeasers were allowed to go and see him. He told me that this matter was in charge of C, and that all arrangements had been made. Hopkinson promised to keep our point of view in mind. I told him of the Gula Pfeffer letter and the importance of the Innere Dienst. I thought that Pfeffer's letter might possibly give us the opening we wanted. [*No other mention of a Gula Pfeffer in this diary*].

May 19, 1941: Richter has broken over the weekend. It now appears that he was dropped by parachute near Hatfield. He was taken to the spot and produced his parachute, wireless set, and crystals and valves which he was bringing for TATE, it seems fairly clear that he is not the Richter who was commonly known as CLARK GABLE. Richter Had been working for a Dr Schultz. In the meantime we have been on the air and complained that the money has never arrived,.

May 21, 1941: Cecil and I flew from Manchester to Dublin to see

Archer [*presumably head of Irish security service?*]. The flight which took 1.5 hours was in a blacked out aeroplane and uneventful. We landed at Colinstown and I imagine I must have passed straight over Lambay. Archer met us at the aerodrome and we went to his house to discuss. He was highly interested at the identification of Marschner with Günter Schutz. I gave him a general picture of our work here and he seemed to have reached the same conclusions as ourselves about the German Intelligence Service. His experience so far of all the agents who landed in Eire, is that their plans were singularly ill-conceived and was badly carried out. Marschner had been spotted wandering about by some woman who kept a hostel for the local police. He had asked his way and she became suspicious about him. The police were informed and he was easily rounded up. He had in his possession a wireless set, £1,000 in British notes and American dollars, a small microscope, a photograph of UNLAND and a piece of paper identical with the paper on which UNLAND had written a number of his letters. This paper had brown streaks on it and a white border. He said that he was going to make contact with UNLAND and that the wireless set was to be fetched by some German agent who would come over from England. Archer does not believe this story. UNLAND has been arrested and was extremely evasive when questioned. He is admitting nothing unless the documentary evidence pins him down. Archer is firmly of the opinion that Marschner was intending to operate his wireless set in conjunction with UNLAND. Marschner's passport is a South African one but it was clear from an examination of it that the photograph had been changed and that the signature slip underneath it had been signed after it had been stuck on to the passport and covered by the embossed stamp.

Marschner had a story of a meeting with a British agent but Archer does not believe this. He thinks the story is put out in order to make the Eire authorities think that Schutz was not operating

against them but against this country.

We then discussed the wireless situation. Archer said they had one Y mast near Dublin which was picking up a lot of recorded traffic. I asked him to get the operator to monitor this traffic and let us have samples on the grounds that we might be able to sort it out for him. He undertook to do this. He told us that he had never got the half dozen HRO sets which had been promised him in the early days of the war. They had been taken over by the army. He is putting in another indent and will get Dulanty to let us know where it is placed, in order that we can give it a push. He has a station for receiving in Limerick, Cork, and Athlone but I do not think these stations pick up very much. He has nothing much in the way of RDF although he had been shown the apparatus in Northern Ireland, or rather it had been shown to one of his operators. He would I think be prepared to set up stations on the East coast for detecting Focke Wolfe planes if we provided him with the necessary equipment. He had never heard of any signals being picked up between a Focke-Wulf [200] and a submarine.

Before we left he asked whether we had heard anything about the suggestion which had appeared in the papers that conscription should be enforced in Northern Ireland. We replied that we had heard nothing about it and had not been consulted in any way, as it was, generally speaking, outside our province. He told us that here was great anxiety in Ireland and that if it were enforced there would undoubtedly be bloodshed. He could not understand what we had to gain. There were 400,000 Catholics in the north and 600,000 Protestants. So far 150,000 have enlisted in the Forces from the South and 19,000 from the North. 600 a month are crossing the border from the South to enlist. Our flying boats on Transatlantic patrol get up off Lough Erne every day and fly over Eire territory so low that it would be impossible for the Eire authori-

ties to say that they could not recognise their markings. Troops from the North constantly wander across the border and instead of being interned are shepherded back. There are moreover a number of other things which the Eire Government are doing to render us assistance. If conscription is enforced in the North a large number of the Catholics will refuse to register and if any attempt is made to prosecute them they will go on the run and join the IRA. Feeling in the South will be extremely bad and it seems quite likely that the Eire Government will try and enforce stricter neutrality. We told Archer that we would certainly represent his views to higher authority as soon as we got back.

May 23, 1941: On my return to London I found that there had been a lot of excitement about the Hess–Haushofer case. Swinton had written a rather offensive letter to the DG complaining that it was an outrage that he should not have been informed about this matter last Nov. [1940] when the original letter was received. He argued that as the case was one of high political importance it should have been brought to his notice immediately. Everybody who was concerned in this case has been asked to give an account of himself. I have expressed the view that though the case was an interesting one, there was no particular point in reporting it until we had found out what Haushofer's intentions were. There had been a certain delay in the Air Ministry in getting hold of Hamilton after we had satisfied ourselves that he was not intriguing behind the back of the Govt., but had we known that he had had a previous letter from Haushofer in July 1939 which he had shown to the PM we might have taken a different view and approached him direct at the outset. This was one of the disadvantages of Downing-Street intelligence. As things had worked out it seemed a very good thing that Hamilton had not made contact with Haushofer. Had he done so, Hess would probably never have come here, since Haushofer would have realised that any attempt to discuss peace

terms would be quite useless.

The Germans have suggested a new plan for getting money to TATE. He is take a bus No. 16 at 4 o'clock on a certain date from Victoria Station. There will be on board a Jap. TATE and the Jap would get off at the first stop and get into the next 16 bus. The Jap would carry *The Times* and a book in his left hand. TATE would get along side him and ask him whether there is any news in the paper. The Jap will then hand him the paper which will contain the money.

Cecil prepared a note on Archer's remarks about conscription in N Ireland which I showed to Swinton, He arranged for myself and VV to go straight onto [Sir John] Anderson, who was seeing the PM on Saturday morning. He questioned me very closely about the memo and seemed to agree in a very guarded way with the views it expressed.

A message came through from SIS to say that a woman with good legs, not a Portuguese, was arriving on the plane from Lisbon. She was a German agent and had her instructions written into the margin of two \$50 notes. Some difficulty was experienced at the port, as three ladies arriving on the plane appeared to qualify. The most suspect was a Mrs Taylor, who said she was the secretary of Pitt-Rivers but nothing could be found on her of an incriminating nature. She therefore had to be released. She is the subject of further investigation.

May 24, 1941: Had a long discussion with TAR about the Jap party. We thought that if possible we ought to carry out some sort of observation on the Jap after he left the bus.

May 25, 1941: AR [Robertson] talked to me about MUTT and JEFF. He wanted to find some sort of home for them both. He would

like to get Jeff established in the vicinity of Aberdeen. Ned [Reid] is going to see what he can do.

We had a further discussion about the Jap party, when it was decided not to follow. Watch is to be kept on likely people at their homes and at Berkeley Court and the Embassy. The SB officers who will be on the bus would proceed to Berkeley Court and the Embassy as soon as the Jap gets off and B.6 will be on observation both before and after 4 p.m. An attempt will be made to get a photograph.

May 26, 1941: We have succeeded in dropping an aerial torpedo on the *Bismarck*, but she has temporarily been lost. She was last seen heading for the Atlantic.

The Jap party was unsuccessful, Nobody turned up at the rendezvous We have gone on the air with another scream.

May 27, 1941: *Bismarck* sunk at 12 noon. I am told that we originally got on to her through the interception of a signal from a Norwegian trawler to some Quisling in Norway.

[...] At the Director's meeting today alternative accommodation was discussed. We are I understand to move to another building pending [bomb damage] repairs to No. 58. We shall then use No. 58 as alternative accommodation.

[...] I saw Wickham in the afternoon, He told me that conscription for N Ireland was definitely off. The whole thing was a political ramp, by politicians in N Ireland. They wanted to appear as great loyalists, but in actual fact hoped that their suggestion would not be acceptable to the home government. Had it been accepted they intended to conscript the Catholics and leave the Orangemen in

the factories...

[...] A message came through for Tate last night. The Jap party is to be repeated on the 29th and 31st. On the night of the 27-28th four birch tree branches each 1 meter long and with money in the thick end, are to be dropped near Luton. Two 20 lb bombs will be dropped in the direction of Charlton and the birch sticks will fall on the continuation of this line at a distance of roughly 1 to 2 kilometres from the second bomb crater, The Germans say that the failure of the Jap meeting was due to delay in transmission which had to go by a roundabout route.

May 28, 1941: [...] The Germans cancelled last night's operation with the birch branches, on the excuse that the plane was not available. Several bombs were however dropped in the vicinity of Luton. We had told the AM about this operation in case they might wish to deal with the aeroplane after it had left the Luton area

The result has been a ghastly muddle, we told the police that we were sending four people to observe what happened, but in the idle of the night a certain Major McCallum turned up at the offices of the superintendent of the Beds. [Bedfordshire] Police. He had an extraordinary story about a man who was going to be dropped by parachute in order that he should assassinate Hess. He wanted full police protection. He said he came from some anti-aircraft brigade, In order to convince the police of his bona fides he took them out to see his Brigadier who was surrounded by AA guns and searchlights. The Home Guard happened to be doing a night exercise and were roped in. Hundreds of men appear to have been walking about all night all over the country. The CC [Chief Constable] was not unnaturally extremely annoyed. He rang up Dixon to tell him that this was the end. The matter is being taken up with the AM.

May 29, 1941: A message has come through to say that TATE is to try the bus party again today, and if he fails he is to go to the Jap embassy to the Naval Attaché and say that he is the man from the 16 bus.

[...] I am told that the *Bismarck* was first detected owing to a signal sent out by a Norwegian trawler to some station in Norway. This signal was picked up and dealt with by GC&CS.

I have just heard that the Jap party has been successful. We got £200 in brand new English notes in series. We took a photograph of the Jap and he was subsequently trailed by two SB women to the Jap embassy. There was some anxiety at one moment as things did not go according to plan. TATE and the Jap, instead of getting off at the first halt, got off when the policeman held up the bus at a cross-roads. They were therefore unable to take the next bus and 4 went by before they could get on board This was rather disconcerting to the SB men who were waiting for them further up the road. Fortunately SB had arranged for a champion cyclist to follow up the bus. he saw what had happened and went on ahead and warned all concerned.

[...]

May 30, 1941: I lunched with Stewart [Menzies]. He is very puzzled about Russia. There is no doubt there is a big move towards the Russian frontier, and 20 Roumanian divisions are to be mobilized on the Bessarabian frontier. He thought that Crete might have been defended if we had taken Rhodes, where we could have had fighter aerodromes. Cunningham apparently offered to take Rhodes weeks ago.

Saw Swinton and told him about TATE's Japanese party. He seemed very interested and satisfied.

KV.4/188 Guy Liddell diary, Jun – Nov 1941

June 2, 1941: Five youths have been arrested in Nottingham. They have been using VHF for months and have been communicating with some of our army units. There is of course no proper organization for detecting VHF or for policing army traffic.

We had a long conference about Sam Stewart, and the procedure to be adopted [*see Jun 10*].

June 4, 1941: I saw Herschel Johnson [counsellor, US embassy] about TRICYCLE, and explained the whole circumstances. He is going to telegraph to the United States about the visa. I also told him about SIMA of the Hungarian embassy who is now in the United States and concerning whom we have grave doubts.

I arranged with V.V. about Semmelbauer and Maas [sic. Maass] who are to be got down from Knapdale [camp]. Rudolph [Rudolf Hess] is going to see somebody of consequence [Lord Simon] and wants a Nazi to be present as a witness. [*Following seven lines, possibly unrelated, have been blanked out in April 2000*].

Frost and I called on Joubert in order to be quite sure that somebody was accepting the responsibility for intercepting VHF from

spies in back areas in time of invasion.

[. . .] I also talked to Joubert about the possibility of establishing RDF masts on the East coast of Eire. He said that this was a very vital matter from the point of view of the defence of this country. He had the masts and would be pleased to give them to the Eire Govt. The difficulty was that the PM had placed an absolute ban on any war material being set to Eire unless they agreed to let us use the ports. I said that Eire had considerable difficulties to overcome in these matters as they might well be accused by the Germans of not adhering to their position of neutrality, but that the present moment however for making a concrete suggestion seemed particularly opportune owing to the recent bombing of Dublin. The Eire Govt. could perfectly well say that they were forced to erect these masts in their own defence. I told Joubert that if he could get over the difficulty with the PM, I thought that we could get the matter arranged through our contact in Dublin.

June 5, 1941: [Lord] Swinton has been asking about Semmelbauer and Maas [sic. Maass]. He has been told about their visit to Camp Z [*Mytchett Place, near Aldershot: A SIS 'miked' house where Rudolf Hess was being held captive*]. . . . Lennox tells me that the Americans are to take over Iceland. This will release at one of our divisions.

June 6, 1941: The concentration of German forces on the Russian frontier continues. It is thought that the Germans may attempt to take Cyprus and it seems doubtful whether we shall be able to hold it. The Japs are showing signs of coming in. They have liquidated almost all their businesses in this country. Shigimitsu [Shigemitsu] is to return to Tokyo and there are doubts whether he will come back. His influence there should be good but it seems doubtful whether he will be able to stand up against [Japanese

foreign minister] Matsuoka. The attitude of the French in Syria is doubtful. They have retired to a line north and south of Damascus. So far there have been no large German troop landings, but aerodromes at Aleppo and Damascus are in their hands. The Turks are anxious to occupy Aleppo but have been dissuaded by us. On the other hand they have let through two train-loads of ammunition to Syria. The Italians are showing considerable activity against India. Their operations are concentrated in Afghanistan and take the usual form of trying to instigate trouble. Ibn Saud has asked the Americans for 1 million men. His request has been transmitted through HMG. There is now an American Military Mission at the War Office, and some American officers are flying out to North Africa on reconnaissance. [. . .]

The DG has finally agreed to the del Campo party. [*Not explained*].

June 7, 1941: I had a talk with [Samuel] Stewart and made the final arrangements about Maas [sic. Maass] and Semmelbauer [*see Jun 5*]. It was agreed that they should be kept apart, that Semmelbauer should remain at Ham [Camp 020??] and that Maas should visit Camp Z alone.

June 8, 1941: We have entered Syria. There has been little resistance so far. . . . Lennox tells me that we have 3 columns advancing into Syria. So far not much news, but the Germans are leaving.

[. . .] I sometimes wonder whether the Germans or Russians are contemplating an attack on India. BJs show that they are very active there, using Afghanistan as a base. . . . The Americans have two brigades in N Ireland. Certain members of the Polish forces in Scotland have been plotting to kidnap and murder Hess. It is difficult to say how far the matter has gone but it is of course the kind of thing they might attempt to do. We are taking steps to get

hold of either the CO or the officers themselves and explain to them what serious harm they might do both to their own cause and to the Allied cause if they attempt to do anything of the kind. This quite apart from what might happen to themselves. I think the Poles imagine that Hess may be making peace overtures and that this will be listened to by the British Govt. Nothing of course could be further from the truth.

June 10, 1941: I was not able to be present [at the director's meeting] as I was interrogated [Samuel] Stewart who has just been arrested. [Shipping agent; relations with German refugee Pohl, and with Snow, whose telephone had been tapped, denials from Stewart]. He was then told that we had positive evidence that the German SS [Secret Service] had confidence in him and it was suggested to him that he should consider very carefully what people he had seen at Antwerp and Hamburg and how this confidence in the minds of the Germans could have been built up. It was on this note that we left him.

June 11, 1941: We discussed Stewart's case in the morning and it was suggested that I should go down and see him next Sunday and have a quiet talk. If this failed to produce anything, other forms of interrogation would be tried.

June 12, 1941: Stewart has applied to see his solicitors, and the HO [Home Office] are reluctant to refuse this request. This means that his solicitor could warn everybody concerned to keep their mouths shut, and will seriously impede our investigations. I went to see Maxwell, who was reluctant to give a definite refusal. He thought it would be best if the Governor should tell Stewart that he should write to his solicitor. His letter would then be submitted for censorship and would probably not reach the solicitor until Monday. This would give us the necessary time to complete our

inquiries. This is a typical illustration of how difficulty it is to carry out investigations properly in a democracy which is fighting a totalitarian enemy.

I saw V.V. today and G-P was also present. I told him that at our meeting of the RSS Committee we had discussed very carefully the importance of building up our staffs concerned in the production of ISOS [intercepts of *Abwehr* cipher messages]. It seemed that G-P was also going to intercept an increasing volume of material, and it was therefore necessary for all those concerned in its production to increase their staffs. I thought also that it might be necessary to get higher authority to say that our requirements were to be met without the usual obstructions. The material was pure Gold and everything should be done to develop it 100%. At present we only took 20% and even then we have difficulty in producing it.

June 13, 1941: SIS report that the German advance on Russia will take place towards the end of this month. The *Lützow* has been hit by an aerial torpedo.

June 14, 1941: Lunched with D.G. Rupert and [Marshal of the Royal Air Force Lord] Trenchard. Trenchard was in very good form. He has been much impressed by our RAF bomber pilots whom he had seen off to the Ruhr two nights ago. He talked a lot about his difficulties at the [Scotland] Yard. He did not think that he had made more than a small dent. He had had a very hard time with the Federation. The first time he met them he found the room full of smoke. He walked out again and did not return for half an hour. He had then proceeded to give them hell about discipline.

...

A Spanish captain called Martin Ocrana has turned up with a high-

grade secret ink disguised as VD medicine. When he was examined it was found that he had never had VD.

We have decided to send Cyril [Mills] to Lisbon to make the necessary contact, as it would obviously be impossible for CELERY to get another visa.

June 15, 1941: I saw Samuel Stewart at Brixton [prison]. [. . .] He gave me certain particulars but nothing which could really explain matters.

June 18, 1941: Dick and JC saw Snow yesterday and went over the whole ground of his relations with Sam Stewart. His story was fairly consistent and in some respects amplified the information he had previously given. Personally I think Stewart has got a lot to explain. [. . .]

In Libya we appear to be more or less back where we started. In Syria de Gaulle forces in the centre are held up but on the left we are advancing toward the coast. Two more supply ships to Tripoli have been sunk. The Russian situation is still obscure.

[. . .] I had lunch with Borum, who is soon going back to America. He has not been home for a good many years and has 23 years service in this country. I doubt whether he will return. I took Ramsbotham along in order that he might have a direct liaison with the American embassy.

[. . .] All sorts of [US] soldiers, sailors and airmen are arriving and they all want to have liaison with us [MI5]. Personally I am all in favour of stocking to the one channel through SIS to the FBI.

June 19, 1941: . . . I was asked to explore the position [of *Bahnpolizei*]

with Sylvanus Vivian.

DG has ordered that auxiliary officers are to go to the regions for a week as soon as possible. There has been a complaint from Singapore that the [subversive, espionage] Japanese activities [in the Colony] are not satisfactorily covered. Everybody here seems to think that they are and that the C in C is not acquainted with what is going on.

I discussed the MANIFOLD case [Sam Stewart?] with the DG, It has been decided to get him away to some suitable colonial post where he can do no harm. [see *Jun 23*]

We had an RSS meeting. It was decided that the question of the circulation of Trevor-Roper's analysis of ISOS should be discussed privately between him, Felix [Cowgill], Dick [White] and myself. Dick and I feel that there is value in the work that he is doing. Cowgill's point is that he only wants the material to circulate if it is properly blanketed. Trevor-Roper has a scholarly approach to the whole question and perhaps a better understanding of the system than anybody else. He is however something of an intellectual snob. [. . .]

June 22, 1941: Had a meeting at Bletchley [Park] at 11.30 which lasted too 4 p.m. with G-P, Maltby, Felix, V.V. and Denniston. We discussed the requirements that would have to be met in connection with ISOS and get a concrete programme. G-P said that he expected 65% increase. He hopes to have 30 double channel Y stations making a total of 120 sets in the first year and he will add another 60 in the second year. At present RSS are only listening to what is group material. They are doing no research work and no policing of service traffic, neither are they taking any Italian SS [secret service] material, which might well be interesting. Further

they are doing no figure cypher work. If RSS are successful in breaking ENIGMA another 65% of material will be added to the existing flow.

The Germans started marching into Russia at 4 a.m. The Führer made one of his topical bombastic speeches. The situation is in some respects almost Gilbertian. The Poles are our allies and are fighting Germany and Russia who are fighting each other. I shall be pleased and surprised if the Germans are not in Moscow within a fortnight. They may however get severely damaged in the process. It is difficult to foresee what may happen if they subdue Russia and get the grain from the Ukraine and oil from Baku. It is not unlikely that they will then march on India and Egypt.

June 23, 1941: I discussed the MANIFOLD case with [Roger] Hollis and Knight, and it is thought that we shall be failing in our duty if we do not have MANIFOLD [Stewart?] interrogated. In my view our primary consideration should be to isolate manifold and important information of which he is in possession. He should be got away as soon as he is told that he is no longer to remain in Intelligence. Knight thinks that he may be thoroughly cowed into silence, and that his connection with SPRINGHALL [Snow?] is extremely sinister. While I agree that it may be, I do not think there is evidence. It is one thing to talk vaguely about your job in MI, and another thing in time of war to commit what you must know to be an offence against the Treachery Act. It is I think of paramount importance to get the man out of the country and away from his communist contacts as early as possible.

[. . .] I saw Joe this afternoon. He told me that a new type of aeroplane [Meteor jet] being manufactured by Power Jet Co has been tested for 10 hours. It is a light craft, run on paraffin, has no propeller and works on the rocket principle. It has been flown at

a height of 26,000 ft where it reaches speeds of 380 miles p.h.

I saw Stewart Menzies ["C"] about Section V. . . . He said that the Finns had for some time been decoding the Russian cyphers and passing the information on to the Germans. I gather that we also have had the benefit of this service. We have now been obliged to inform the Russians of the position [*as Finland had joined in BARBAROSSA*].

Lennox tells me . . . The Germans estimate that it will take them 6–7 weeks to bring the campaign in Russia to a successful conclusion. . . . The CP [Communist Party] have issued instructions to their District Organisers on the attitude they should adopt towards the Russo-German war. They are to organise broad United Front solidarity with the Soviet Union. They are to demand immediate diplomatic agreement with the Soviet Union. They are to urge the removal of reactionaries from places of power in the Government. They are to advocate the raising of the ban on the *Daily Worker*, the placing of [Rudolf] Hess on trial, and the publication of all documents.

June 25, 1941: I had another discussion with the DG and M about the MANIFOLD [Stewart?] case. I pointed out clearly that our objective should be the safeguarding of ISOS rather than the possibility of obtaining information which might incriminate MANIFOLD. I thought if MANIFOLD were interrogated and denied any close connection with the CP, he would be bound to associate his removal to other spheres with any feelings that we might have about his political views. This might possibly lead to difficulties. On the other hand if he gave a free confession the Army might wish to kick him out. We should not have sufficient information to intern him under 18b. He would be disgruntled and we could not prevent him from passing information which he might have

obtained in MI8 to his communist friends, if he has not already done so. I thought that if he could be transferred in an MI capacity to some remote island this would probably be the best solution. I learned that the DG later decided that he should not be interrogated.

June 26, 1941: The question of having some relations with the Russian Intelligence Service has arisen. I feel that they should know a great deal about German espionage activities against this country. The approach is rather a delicate matter and we are proposing to open the ball with the Czechs.

June 30, 1941: I saw [Charles] Medhurst [Air Ministry intelligence] in the morning and consulted him about the project to set up wireless masts on the East coast of Eire. He said that this matter had been discussed by the Air Staff about 10 days ago. The Chief of the Air Staff was reluctant to give the Germans the opportunity of inspecting these masts through the good offices of some Quisling member of the Eire Govt. unless there were some system by which the Irish authorities would be prepared to transmit the information obtained to our Air Force. Personally I think they would do so in the same way they have given us information about submarine sonar on the West coast.

Medhurst told me that a certain French Colonel G had arrived here from France under the auspices of MI6. He is said to have come from Pétain and Hun[t]ziger. He is anxious to get as much information as he can about our powers of resistance and about the effect of American cooperation. The matter came up at the JIC when Medhurst refused to give him any facilities to visit aircraft establishments unless he knew more about him. As is usual in these matters, Col G is being dealt with on a high plane and has been seen by Eden and the PM. We have been told nothing about

it.

Lennox tells me that the C in C of the Russian Forces [Timoshenko] is optimistic but that his Chief of Staff is pessimistic. . . . Eden had a conversation with [Ivan] Maisky [Soviet ambassador] the other day about our mission to Russia. Maisky said that he wanted this to be on a reciprocal basis. When asked if that meant that he wanted a mission here, he said no. His Govt. merely wanted to assist us as we had offered to assist them. [*More about Moscow's desire for an agreement with Britain; and Hitler's likely future plans.*]

July 1, 1941: . . . We then had a discussion with Bird about the Holorith [sic. Hollerith machine-card computer]. Horrocks thinks that visual cards under about 5 categories would be ore effective in dealing with censorship material since likes would be more easily thrown up. The Holorith cards were filed only under the name of the addressee and thereafter relied on somebody's memory or on information from other sources. Bird is going to study the matter but feels that the visual system will involve a great deal of work and throw up an enormous number of perfectly useless likes, which will have to be put up to some competent officer for a decision as to whether they are of importance or not.

July 3, 1941: I sent the full report about the Polish plot case [to assassinate Hess] to the DG today suggesting that he might wish to show it to Swinton. It has been disclosed that some 17 Polish officers and possibly 2 British subjects had worked out a scheme to assassinate Hess but it seemed that as the plot was due to take place on May 19th the project may well have been abandoned. Alley says that the Poles are always formulating plots and schemes, most of which never materialise, but that you can never be quite certain that they will not go off the deep end without much warn-

ing. The Poles seem to think that Hess may have come here to offer peace negotiations and that the British Govt may succumb to the idea, leaving the Poles in the hands of Germany.

DG was very annoyed that this matter had not previously been brought to his notice. He felt that if anything should happen his position and that of the whole office would have been quite untenable.

July 4, 1941: [Muselier's chef de cabinet Laporte gives a long account of the Muselier affair.]

July 5, 1941: I saw Gen. Hunter and Col. Coates [of War Office, Prisoner of War directorate?] about the Polish plot. Hunter knew Hesketh Pritchard who was one of the Englishmen thought to be concerned. Pritchard seems to be of an SO2 type. He attached himself to the Guards at the beginning of the war and was rather a nuisance. He was a very good shot and interested in sniping. . . . Hunter suggested. . . that [Pritchard] could be very useful to the plotters since he would have access to the Guards mess at Pirbright and might find out quite a lot about Hess. . . . Cookie is to go down to Camp Z [*Mytchett*] on Monday with Coates in order to acquaint the Commandant [*Malcolm Scott of the Scots Guards*] with the position and study the general layout.

. . . I also saw Stewart and explained the position to him. He agreed to this procedure. He told me that Hess had attempted to commit suicide by throwing himself over the banisters. He had only succeeded in breaking his leg. His mental state is said to be improving and he may possibly broadcast, at some future date. He is not so suspicious about his food being poisoned as he was.

[. . .] I had a long talk with Hart about 1505. He is quite convinced

that if Trevor-Roper goes, a great deal will be missed. Hart is quite convinced that Trevor-Roper is right and Felix wrong. He feels that you cannot separate the technical side of ISOS from the Intelligence side.

July 7, 1941: I saw de Rema about the Polish plot to murder Hess. De Rema [*evidently a secret British liaison officer to the Poles*] made a very good impression. He has obviously handled the whole business with great ability and discretion. [. . . more detail.] I suggested to him that it might be a good plan if some Minister of standing, preferably the PM if he could spare the time, could visit Polish units [in Scotland] and explain to them our aims and objects in the present struggle and the meaning of certain political events which took place in this country. They would not then be worrying their heads about irresponsible statements made by politicians in the House and elsewhere. [. . . *Another page of detail on this.*]

July 14, 1941: Saw Maxwell about Semmelbauer and Maas. I explained to him our difficulty, namely that there was information in the possession of Maas concerning which we could not run the slightest risk of leakage [*probably the fact the Lord Simon, a Cabinet minister, had had talks with Hess.*] Maas had to have a companion and the only solution seemed to be to put him together with Semmelbauer and keep them at Ham for the duration. This would mean that they could not have communication with the Protecting Power [Switzerland] who would undoubtedly get to know they were no longer at Knapdale and make enquiries. There would be no harm in their corresponding with anyone else as from the Oratory Schools provided their letters were strictly censored. If the protecting Power made inquiries they would have to be warned off. There was a precedent of a corresponding nature in the case of Stevens and Best to whom nobody had been al-

lowed access since they were illegally removed from Dutch territory at the beginning of the war. Maxwell agreed to the plan, and said that he would arrange for the necessary ministerial backing if an awkward situation arose.

[*More about RDF stations on East coast of Eire.*] I had a short talk with V.V. about Trevor-Roper. He said that he had washed his hands of the whole business, as T.R. now said he did not wish to set up a separate organisation for dealing with ISOS.

July 16, 1941: A plan is being worked out for making 100% low-grade test for secret ink on all mails going to certain destinations. It is proposed to get a suitable agent to insert a letter written [*a.v.? 18 letters blanked out ending in ++++lite?*] which can be brought up, expunged, and brought up again. In this way it is hoped that the Germans seeing that our test has not apparently brought up the a[+++++++ ++++++] writing will get confidence in this ink and use it more extensively. We can then have a major test of all letters for a.v. One of the advantages is that we shall be able to watch the correspondence without being forced to stop the letter.

July 17, 1941: There has been no development in the Polish plot situation. All seems quiet.

July 18, 1941: We had a meeting today with Sir Frank Nelson, Archie Boyle, and Taylor of SO2. SO2's charter covers (1) political subversion; this includes bribery of ministers and of whole political parties, (2) large scale operations, for example the Lofoten expedition. (3) small scale day to day sabotage. This includes train wrecking. (4) distribution of subversive propaganda.

There is a certain overlap here with SO1 who make and disseminate

propaganda in foreign countries. SO2 disseminate rumours through their own stations abroad.

July 19, 1941: P/W reports indicate that the Germans are giving up automatic bomb releasing. Formerly the bomb was released automatically at the intersection of 2 beams. We have been throwing another beam producing an intersection at a different point. . . . [. . . *More details*].

July 21, 1941: I lunched today with Herschel Johnson [of US embassy] to whom I introduced Theo Turner. He expressed himself in very warm terms about [William] Stephenson and the work he was doing in America. Everybody seemed to like him, and regard him as extremely efficient.

July 22, 1941: Hart who is continuing his enquiry into the leakage of information about our minefields has now discovered that there is another document which shows quite clearly that at least 4 of the minefields were disclosed to the enemy through charts taken from the sunken submarine *Shark*.

July 23, 1941: A meeting was held at Kinnaird House today to discuss various aspects of Stephenson's work in America, particularly that which affected the vetting of technicians, etc. Stephenson himself who had just arrived from America was present. It has been agreed that he should extend his security co-ordination to the S American ports.

July 24, 1941: I lunched with Jebb [presumably Gladwyn Jebb.] He told me that SO2 had been rather worried by the DG's letter which they construed as being a projected attack on themselves. . . . Jebb told me that SO1 now have 23 Freedom Stations which are doing valuable work. He said that the German attack on Russia

had been carefully thought out from the point of view of self-sufficiency. He believed that the Germans had calculated that they could hold out for several years if they succeeded in tapping certain of Russia's resources. These of course included the oil.

July 25, 1941: Had a talk with [William] Stephenson, and gave him as much about the general situation as possible. He was very worried about the flow of information. It seemed that we had sent him a number of things, which he had not received, and that he had sent us reports which do not seem to have reached us.

[. . .] The Japs have started to occupy Indo-China. We have requested the Persians to get rid of their large German tourists population, but have virtually been told to mind our own business. The PM was extremely annoyed and intends to occupy Abadan and if necessary to bomb Teheran.

July 26, 1941: Moore of the RFUC has come to an agreement with his contact in the Garda [Irish police] by which we are to be lent [Joseph] Lenihan's wireless set for 8 days. [*Lenihan was an agent dropped in the Curragh with instructions to send weather reports to Sligo, then air raid damage reports from England; he surrendered at once to the British.*]. We are to lend the auxiliary one-way set to the Eire Govt for a similar period. Before the agreement was signed, the matter was referred to Dev [de Valera].

July 28, 1941: Saw [William] Stephenson again. He told me about certain technical apparatus which the Americans were using. They have a very good camera which can be easily concealed in a wireless set. There is no click, it merely makes the ordinary wireless noises. The Americans also use a special device for tapping in to telephones. This can be clamped on an outside wall and is apparently very effective.

July 29, 1941: W had an RSS meeting at which isosceles was discussed. This is the Vichy–Berlin group which we do not normally receive. There have been at least 3 cases where we have not been informed about matters which have a definite CE [counter-espionage] interest. . . . I was asked to take this matter up with V.V. or CSS.

August 5, 1941: I visited Barnet with the DG and also PW. We were shown the whole progress of ISOS from its interception to the finished article.

August 6, 1941: RAINBOW has received a letter in Portuguese. One of the full-stops has been found to contain a message of 100 words. RAINBOW has been warned that he might expect some communication in this form. The process is micro-photography. [*See too Aug 11*]

August 7, 1941: I have seen another candidate for our Jap post [MI5 Japanese section], one Pilcher, late Consul at Tsingtao. He is now working in M of I. He reads and speaks Japanese and seems fairly knowledgeable. I am not sure however whether he would fit into the organisation very well. He seems to be of the FO self-opinionated type, although his views about the Japanese are sound. He thinks that they have made up their minds to go south and that only a show of force will prevent them.

August 11, 1941: Theo [Turner] and I went to see Stewart [Menzies?] about the various Allied governments. In many cases we employed the same contacts. We got on very well with them on CE lines but SIS fell out with them on offensive operations. Most of these Governments wanted to run their own little SS [Secret Service] without proper control and the results are extremely confusing. We

felt that it would be a good thing if we pooled all our information. Stewart agreed, and thought that Theo should discuss the whole matter with Dansey. I went on to see V.V. and had a word with him about ISOSICLES [sic. ISOSCELES? *Also elsewhere ISOSOCLES*]

[. . .] I lunched with Herbert and brought him back afterwards to see the Dot. [*i.e. the recently discovered microdot*]. He was very much impressed and said that it would entirely revolutionise censorship methods. He would think out some method of making the best use of the information without running too great a risk of the enemy becoming aware that we have knowledge of their methods.

August 12, 1941: I spoke to the DG about ISOSICLES. He is inclined to agree that the information should be made available and that we should be the judges as to whether it was of interest to us or not.

Herbert rang up to ask me for rainbow's name and address. I referred that matter to the DG who said that on no account could we communicate the name and address of an agent. He would not mind doing it to Herbert personally but he could not do so to Herbert in his capacity as head of Censorship, since this would imply that he would have to make some use of the information and that in so doing he would of necessity pass it to others.

[. . .] The message in the Dot contains over 80 words and refers to formulae for secret inks. It is quite clear that this method has been in use for some time. There is a reference in ISOS to *Punkte* as early as November 1940 and another one early this year. The indications are that this method has been used as between German-occupied territory and America but not in the reverse direction.

This is confirmed by an examination of the Joe K. correspondence. Eastward bound it disclosed secret ink, but westward bound the examination has given no reaction.

August 13, 1941: I had a talk with Allan [of the] GPO about Censorship measures to compete with the Dot. We thought that the information for the present should be confined to certain special examiners here and in Bermuda.

August 14, 1941: I lunched with V.V. . . and the DG when we discussed the questions of BJs. I tried to press home my point that if we were to make a proper study of developments here it was essential for us to have as much information, both positive and negative, as we could obtain. BJs were especially valuable since it was in communications of this sort that they expressed their innermost thoughts. V.V. . . was rather inclined to take the view that there would be no limit to our requirements. I said that it was for this reasons that I had suggested that [Anthony] Blunt should go down periodically to GC&CS and make notes. This would save everyone a great deal of trouble and avoid filing a large amount of this material in our office.

TAR [Robertson], Allan of GPO, Felix [Cowgill] and I had a discussion about methods for exploiting the Dot discovery. We all agreed that the first step was to clarify the position in the USA. It was essential to know whether the recent arrests there had led to the discovery of this new method and whether the Americans were proposing to make any use of this information in open court. If this were so, it would probably be inadvisable for us to take the risk of informing all examiners instead of restricting it to a few. We all fell that every possible pressure should be brought to bear on the Americans to keep the matter secret.

August 15, 1941: Jacobs was shot this morning after trial by court martial. Cookie saw him a few hours before and was very impressed by his pluck and calm bearing. [*This is the only reference to a Jacobs in this volume, identified in the index further as being 'J. Jacobs'.*]

A cousin of Pilcher's who is commanding a battalion of the Guards at Windsor is under arrest for communicating information obtained from an Intelligence summary to [Kenneth] de Courcy [*who published a private Intelligence report hostile to the government*].

. . . I lunched with Herbert. We decided to make the following arrangements with regard to censorship: Herbert will select examiners, of proven reliability, and attach them to Webb. They will deal with the westbound air mails from Lisbon, mails from Stockholm and the transmit mails to Eire. A similar organisation will be set up in Bermuda. TAR is to explain to the special examiners exactly what they are to look for. We have heard in the meantime from TRICYCLE that the D.O.T. [sic] is being extensively used. It may on occasion be found under the lower flap of an envelope. A telegram has already come from American which indicates that the FBI have discovered the Dot method and also the microscope for reading it. They have not found any apparatus for microphotography.

I saw Maxwell and put before him Maass and Semmelbauer's petition. I pointed out that the Home Secretary probably knew nothing about the [Lord] Chancellor's [Sir John Simons's] visit and that before this document was shown to him an approach should be made to the Prime Minister's department since I thought this mater would come better from there than from us.

August 25, 1941: British and Russian forces have entered Iran and do not appear to be meeting with any resistance.

[. . .] Wallem, one of 3 Norwegians who arrived on the *Hernie* [referred to in an earlier entry] has broken after interrogation at Ham. He admits that he is a German agent, that he was sent over here in order that the British might employ him as a double-cross and send him back to Norway where he would have operated a wireless set under control. He says that his colleagues Nielsen and Lunde are not involved. [*See also entry for Aug 28, not copied, for further developments*].

August 29, 1941: The PM has decided that provided they give an undertaking [not] to divulge any information, Maas and Semmelbauer can go back to Knapdale [P/W camp].

September 1, 1941: [. . .] A parachute corps is being formed and Stone tells me that members of the BUF [British Union of Fascists] or those who have had any connection with it in the past are being turned down automatically. [*Long discussion of this policy.*]

[. . .] Trevor Roper came to see me. He seems to be very worried by the fact that his work is not given official recognition. . . . he was still very keen on having an ISOS bureau officially established, and he questioned the right of Section V to control the circulation of and action on ISOS material. In this latter point I told him that he was not on very good ground. It had for years been the prerogative of GC&CS to deal with codes and cyphers. It was true that we had to some extent been instrumental in discovering the group traffic, but we had to admit that it related to information obtained abroad, and that in that sense SIS would be the sifting office. . . . Were it not for the difficult personality of T-R and his quarrels

with [Major] Felix [Cowgill of SIS] the whole matter could have been settled months ago. [*A 2 page discussion.*]

September 2, 1941: . . . It is quite clear that [secret mail] communications will in future be in secret ink and in the micro dot. The problem is to discover what form of correspondence is carrying either. Searches are being made for the dot on certain mails outward bound from the Continent and periodical tests are being carried out for secret ink. This seems to be more or less the limit to what can be done effectively.

[. . .] I attended a meeting at the FO, with CSS and Cadogan, to decide about the suggested exchange of Gerlach [*former German consul in Iceland, who was held in the Tower*] and others for a number of our diplomats and consular officers. [. . . CSS] made this point very clear to Cadogan and said that had he been acquainted of what was going on at an earlier date he would have suggested Stevens [*of Venlo Incident fame*] as an exchange for Gerlach. . . . It seems that the PM had put in a last minute suggestion that we should bargain with the Germans captured in Iran instead of with Gerlach and Company, but the FO turned this down on account of the negotiations being so far advanced. . . .

I saw Maxwell about Semmelbauer and Maass and informed him of the PM's decision that their undertaking should be accepted and that they should be allowed to return to Knapdale. He was anxious to know whether he could now inform the S of S. [Herbert Morrison]. . . . He telephoned later to say that quite accidentally he had found out that the S of S knew all about the proceedings at Camp Z [*the visit by Sir John Simon*]. He therefore proposed to tell him of the latest developments.

September 5, 1941: There has been an interesting 1505 case. It be-

came apparent that 3 Norwegians Sverre, Stefansen and Elverstadt were preparing for some expedition. The message said Iraq, but it was difficult to see why 3 Norwegians should be going to that country. T-R discovered that the *q* was probably a misprint for *x*, and that the *r* was probably a misprint for a *d*. This left "Ida" in inverted commas, since *x* is used for this purpose. Ida is the speller in German Morse for I. This leaves "I" in inverted commas, and from the context it seemed likely to be Iceland. A telegram to Iceland has produced a reply that a boat called the *Hornfjell* recently arrived with 8 crew and passengers. Three of them being Saetrang, Stefansen, and Elverstand. They are all being sent over here for examination. This case is a clear indication of T-R's value.

September 6, 1941: De Gaulle seems to have thoroughly blotted his copybook, in Africa, Egypt and Syria. He has been talking a lot against the British and saying that he would like to place his movement under the American flag. The PM is extremely annoyed and has given orders that o department is to have any relations with him for the time being. As this order has never reached us we are in the ironical position of being his only friends. De Gaulle has apparently become very swollen headed. Muselier on the other hand has made a declaration of loyalty to the PM. There is some anxiety lest De Gaulle should attempt to leave the country. We have been asked to do what we can. Our task is not an easy one, since in the classic phrase, 'It is important that his suspicions should not be aroused in any way.'

September 16, 1941: The PM wants a report on Jap contacts in this country. I have asked Blunt to compile this and to send it to Loxley who will collate it with other information from the FO.

[. . .] The new Commandant of the RPS, Major Begg, has packed up. He does not feel he can make the grade.

September 17, 1941: Stephens rang me up early this morning to say that Saetrang, one of the Norwegians who arrived on the *Hornfjell*, had committed suicide, by hanging himself from a waterpipe with his scarf. He had stripped himself to the waist and gagged himself by stuffing a handkerchief down his throat. He had only been interrogated for 4 minutes on his arrival on the previous day. He had been told that he had information which connected him with the German S.S. [secret service] and that he had better consider the advisability of making a written statement. He had been seen by the guard at 4 a.m. and must have committed suicide sometime between 4 and 6.

On arrival at the office, I got hold of Cookie and Cussen in order that we could make arrangements for a coroner's inquest with the least possible publicity. They have made arrangements to do this effectively, through a tame coroner in the north of London.

Swinton was in the office in the morning and I explained the facts to him. From the Intelligence point of view it is a pity that Saetrang has done himself in. We think he is identical with a man called Sverra, and that he could have told us a great deal.

September 19, 1941: Scrogheim of the *Hornfjell* has amongst his kit a bottle of medicine which he says is for VD. He is not at present suffering from any such disease, but we are taking a test to see whether he ever has suffered from such a complaint. The medicine can also be used as a very high grade secret ink, and has been used by the Germans on a previous occasion. Scrogheim is a close friend of Saetrenng.

Lunched with V.V. [Vivian?] when I covered an immense amount of ground. . . . We also had a long talk about America. I said that

I doubted whether Stephenson was equipped to deal with our particular enquiries. There had been no action so far on my letter of April last year that technicians should be recruited from XX [double cross] work, and the Joe K case revelations in the American Press were extremely damaging to our work. We had never received any details about the case and we had never been told of the proposed action. Surely, if the relations with the FBI were so good this could have been done. V.V. agreed that the present situation left much to be desired, although he thought from reports he had seen that Stephenson was sufficiently equipped to deal with these matters.

September 20, 1941: The Germans appear to have taken Kiev. The Spiers [sic. General Louis B Spears] Mission have rung through to say that de Gaulle wishes to see the five Frenchmen who escaped to this country in canoes. They are still under examination at the RPS. As this might be an awkward precedent and as everybody has been told that De Gaulle is to receive no special favours, I rang up Desmond Morton. He told me that orders had just been given by the PM and would be seen by himself and the general. It seems therefore that a better atmosphere has been created.

September 22, 1941: I saw CCS [Menzies] and Viv. about the suggestions of the CC Committee that somebody should go to America to co-ordinate our policy with the FBI. [*more detail follows*]

September 23, 1941: There has been a certain amount of trouble with [Major] Felix [Cowgill, of SIS] over the case of Elverstad. We had reached a point in his interrogation where it was necessary to establish whether he had acted as a conscious or unconscious courier for the German S.S. We felt that probably only the original

German text might enlighten us. Felix thought that this was a contravention of our agreement and wrote me a rather embittered letter saying that he was sending the information along as he “did not wish to be accused of withholding information from MI5.”

[. . .] Swinton came at 6 p.m. to discussed [sic] the PM’s anxieties about various British subjects who were making contact with the Japanese. We went over the whole ground with him. He will reply to the PM who had become very excited about the whole matter on account of a BJ, that for certain reasons Gerothwohl should be left at large, that Sempill should in accordance with our advice given years ago be removed from the Admiralty, that Edwards was openly receiving #4,500 a year from the Japs and it was believed was of certain value to the FO, that Swinton should speak to McGrath, that George Sale knew very little but was inclined to put business before country, and that Piggott was a pathological Japophile but honest.

September 24, 1941: Milmo told me that Eger had been the subject of considerable correspondence with SIS, that they had no real case against him and that he had therefore been released from Brixton.

The Norwegians are to be informed about the suicide of Saetreng.

[. . .] Sempill has been asking for further particulars about Sempill. He is evidently going to put in a pretty strong note to the PM. I do not think that the Admiralty will come very well out of it.

September 30, 1941: I attended a meeting of the JIC to discuss the case of Gerlach. The GOC Iceland had registered a strong protest to the WO that a man which such intimate knowledge of the is-

land and an SS [secret service] man at that should on o account be released. We have of course been saying this since July 1940 but with no effect. The discussion was somewhat academic as Gerlach left this country last Thursday. . . . Cavendish-Bentinck said that the case had been discussed on a fairly high level and that in view of the importance of effecting an exchange for Oliphant it had been decided to proceed with the negotiations.

[. . .] I thought that we should make a statement in the House to the effect that we should in future for very good reasons proceed on exactly the same lines as the Germans. The House should not think that because they were not told about the capture and execution of spies that nothing of the kind was going on. This would leave our hands free to retain [alive] the majority of those who come over, in order that we can extract from them further information in the light of facts disclosed by later arrivals. . . . Execution should be the exception rather than the rule.

October 1, 1941: I lunched with Hopkinson and Stewart Menzies.

October 4, 1941: Plan STENCH is in operation. Porton is being asked to make a special gasmask which will contain certain ingredients which will puzzle the German scientists. They will think that because we are introducing these ingredients we have some very special gas about which they don't know. The mask will also have earpieces, in order to give the impression that we have some new gas which affects the ears. There have already been rumours about such a gas. It has not yet been decided how this gas mask is to reach the Germans.

October 7, 1941: We had an RSS meeting. We are now intercepting 216 stations and there has been a steady rise in the decoded traffic.

October 10, 1941: Swinton rang up to say that he had learned from Herbert that the Americans have known about the DOT [microdot system] for some considerable time. Herbert had given Swinton to understand that this information had been sent over by Stephenson, but had never reached us. I said that I could not believe that this was possible. We had known that Stephenson was inclined to say that he had sent material and when he made inquiries found that he had not. I was however quite clear that the FBI were being extremely cagey about the information they obtained. They should have kept us informed about their big spy case [*the Joe K case?*] and should certainly have consulted us before taking action. I rang up V.V. . . and told him what Swinton had said. He thought that there might quite well be a misunderstanding between the discovery of the DOT and the discovery of Microphotography. We have all known about Microphotography for some considerable time, but the first we heard of the Dot was from RAINBOW.

October 17, 1941: ISOS discloses that the Germans have two agents in our Embassy in Ankara and that they had have access to our diplomatic bag.

October 22, 1941: In the afternoon Dick [White] and I went down to see Collins who has just established himself in new quarters in the City. He has a very fine laboratory and all the necessary apparatus for dealing with secret ink. We told him more or less what our plan was for the future and he seemed thoroughly pleased that we should be taking an interest in his work and attempting to get him the necessary staff to carry it out. He said that he thought he would want at least 3 or 4 qualified chemists and anything up to 50 people to apply the necessary tests to suspect correspondence. He gave us a number of demonstrations, particu-

larly with regard to the damping test. It is quite possible by applying a solution of mag.sulph. to see that the paper has been damped. When the brush containing the solution is applied the liquid is not usually absorbed but forms into blobs. A secondary test is the application of iodine which when blotted leaves only a very faint mark. There are however certain papers which even though they may not have been damped will react to these tests as if they had been treated. The idea in sorting out letters by the damping test [is?] to subsequently submit the undamped letters to the minor test and the damped or doubtful letters to the major test. The Germans are now using A.V. in a .001 solution, and this involves the use of a reagent which cannot be expunged. If therefore we are to submitted all damped correspondence to the major test every day we shall not only run the risk of getting our agents who are using these inks blown, but will probably force the Germans to use some new ink for which we may not have the reagent. It is therefore desirable if possible to find some e-agent to deal with the .001 solution which can be satisfactorily expunged. The letter can then be sent on after being read without any undue risk. Collins is very excited about the new ink which is based on Vitamin B.

October 23, 1941: We had the RSS meeting. After transacting the ordinary business we discussed the question of phoney broadcasts from Germany. . . . In the Anna Wolkoff case [*related to the Tyler Kent case*] it was established that the message transmitted to Haw-Haw contained 3 references to the world "Carlisle". These 3 references were actually monitored and formed an important part of the evidence in the case.

I lunched with Borum [of US embassy] who had just returned from America. He is to be relieved of all his staff duties and will now be head of protocol. He will continue to handle our work but [. . .

etc.]

October 25, 1941: Herbert of the Censorship called about his visit to America. While in Stephenson's office in New York [Rockefeller Center] he had been shown a number of isos messages which had been picked up locally which contained a certain amount of information about the use of DOT and secret inks, also a number of names and addresses which he thought should have been in the possession of [Censorship at] Bermuda. He accordingly made a list of these names and addresses and with Stephenson's approval wired them to his censorship point. He was rather annoyed about not having been given this information before. He said that it would have made a good deal of difference to his work e.g. had he know that the DOT was only operating on westbound mails he would have concentrated all his secret ink testing effort on the eastbound mail. As regards S America he had discovered that DOT was operating in both directions. While I think Herbert's complaint is justifiable up to a point, I do not think he takes enough trouble in analysing the position within his own show. BY a simple mathematical calculation it should be quite easy for him to estimate what his chances are or picking up a letter, almost regardless of what we tell him.

October 31, 1941: Cecil has discovered a nun in this country who is writing in secret ink to a prior in Ireland. It seems to be a love affair. The correspondence is merely obscene.

November 1, 1941: I had a talk with Jock Whyte about the Jackson case, One Gunner Jackson wrote a letter to the Spanish embassy which we succeeded in getting out through a friend of Major Rawlinson. Jackson said that he was fed up with the war and everything else and wanted assistance to get to Germany in order that he could broadcast. After clearing the ground with Rawlinson

we decided to write Gunner Jackson a letter saying that his request had gone through and that we had been advised to make contact with him. He has replied, suggesting a meeting. [*Jackson was subsequently tried and hanged. See later entries.*]

November 3, 1941: [+++++] said that Stephenson was very het up about the criticisms that he had received over the Joe K. case.

[. . .] I had a word with Stewart [Menzie] who told me that active enquiries were going on at the Embassy in Ankara, since it had been discovered that a blue print of one of our guns was missing from the MA's office. We knew this in fact from ISOS, but it was only after telegrams had been sent out from the WO suggesting that something was wrong that the facts became clear. There is obviously somebody purloining documents in the Embassy. The bag to which the German had access according to ISOS, was one brought from Cairo to Ankara by our assistant Air Attaché. In addition to a certain amount of information about C's activities in Istanbul it contained re-ciphering tables. Had the MA reported about his blue print it would have been known that probably these tables were compromised at a much earlier date. Luckily they have not yet been put into operation and the necessary action has been taken.

November 5, 1941: Saw Maxwell today about Semmelbauer and Maass. I explained to him our difficulty about moving them as long as the repatriation of internees was in the air. It was essential that they should go to some Camp from which there was no repatriation. Both Maxwell and Hutchinson appreciated the difficulty. They seemed doubtful about giving any guarantee against release, but felt that possibly a guarantee might be obtained against repatriation. I said that what we wanted to guard against was pressure at some future date by the FO to release a man on the exchange

basis and that for this reason we hoped it would be possible to reach some degree of finality. I suggested that we should comb through the Nazi Camp X and divide the internees into Party organisers, Party members and people with technical knowledge. Hutchinson seemed to doubt whether mere membership of the Party would constitute grounds for repatriation. if a suitable exchange could be effected. In the meantime I am afraid Semmelbauer and Maass will have to remain where they are.

I had a hasty talk with VV about the possibility of my going to America, and about our difficulties with Felix [Cowgill]. It seemed fairly clear to me that Felix did not wish me to go to America [. . .] I did not however intend to travel around with Felix with the feeling that all the time I was not wanted. VV said a little unconvincingly I think that that was not the case but that owing to a letter that he had received from C, [William] Stephenson was extremely nettled at the criticism which had been levelled at his organisation for not keeping us informed about the Joe K case. Stephenson had sent a rather hot reply concluding with a statement to the effect that he would be glad to know who this paragon was who was coming out to show him how to run his business.

[. . .] TAR [Robertson] is rather worried about the execution of Richter, as he thinks it may place TATE in difficulties. He is putting up a note.

I went to a cocktail party which was a farewell to Herschel Johnson. He is going to Sweden as [US] Minister, and his departure is regretted by all. We are I fear losing a very good friend.

November 6, 1941: I spent the night with VV in the country and had a very long talk which really centred round Felix [Cowgill]

[. . .] The complaint of all my [MI5] people was that they could not reason with Felix [MI6] that he merely dug his toes in and withheld information [. . .] Since everybody had told me the same thing and I had to some extent experienced it myself it was impossible for me to ignore the matter [. . .] He [VV] said that [. . .] he did not intend that the twenty years of intimate cooperation between ourselves should not continue in the frankest possible way. The idea that Felix should hold anything back from Dick [White] or other senior members of this dept. seemed to him quite ridiculous [. . .] VV said the CSS [Menzies] had suggested that I should not go to America at the moment owing to the general atmosphere that prevailed in New York [i.e. Stephenson's HQ]. I told VV that there were moments when I wondered how Felix would be received, and that although it was not my business I did feel that if I went alone I could probably carry both Stephenson and the FBI.

November 7, 1941: We had a meeting with Collins and Sir Robert Robinson whose advice was asked regarding suitable chemists for work on secret ink. It was suggested that where we had special problems to solve, we might farm these out to suitable laboratories. In addition we might procure the services of an expert in dye stuffs and of several juniors who were suitable for training and possibly for sending abroad to Censorship points throughout the Empire.

At the RSS meeting we raised the question of the inception [sic. interception?] of German radio in the western hemisphere, Herbert having been shown a number of messages in New York which never reached us. It seems that the present procedure is a little cumbersome. Messages come over by mail and are then passed through the machinery of GC&CS. They emerge finally in the form of isos. I gather that GP went into the whole problem

when he was in America and that some improvement may be expected.

[Lord] Swinton came over to discuss the case of Richter. He read my minute in which I had pointed out once more the undesirability of the preset procedure. I had suggested that in future the matter should be dealt with by a statement in the House to the effect that it was not the intention of the Govt. to publish details regarding the apprehension and execution of spies, and that the House should not assume that because o details were published, spies were not being caught and executed. This would leave our hands free. Swinton said that he would have to consider this matter rather carefully. As regards the particular case of Richter, he thought that it would be unwise to press for a reprieve since the information would undoubtedly leak out with results which would be detrimental to B.1a's organisation. There were two alternatives, either to proceed as usual, or to suppress the notice of the execution and make a special appeal to editors.

My fear was that the bare mention of Richter's name in the press might cause the Germans to make a thorough inquiry into our traffic, possibly with disastrous results, since Richter was linked with TATE, and TATE with TRICYCLE and RAINBOW, and TRICYCLE with BALLOON and GELATINE.

There was in addition the legal difficulty since Richter had made an appeal in which he stated that he knew that Tate was under Govt. control. Cookie has got Richter to withdraw this statement which is in no way relevant to the normal legal appeal. He has told him that he can put this in with his appeal to the Home Secretary if his appeal fails.

TAR [Robertson] and I had a consultation about the case after-

wards and decided that it was best to let it take its normal course.

[. . .] I attended a meeting of the JIC at which it was decided that in the event of war with Japan there should be an all for all exchange of internees with the exception of Eguchi who is already interned. It was pointed out however that if negotiations regarding this matter were started now it would be tantamount to giving the Japs a free run in putting spies into British territory. This should be a matter for consideration at the highest level.

November 9, 1941: Plan GUY FAWKES went off at 4 a.m. this morning. The bombs were successfully placed, but while the Superintendent was keeping watch a War Reserve Policemen appeared on a bicycle. He saw Harmer waiting in the car and asked him what he was doing. Harmer said he was waiting for somebody. The constable then became inquisitive and Harmer was obliged to refer him to the Superintendent. The constable was threatened with every possible penalty if he said anything about what he had seen. Unfortunately however he was not told to leave the site. As soon as the fire started he raised the alarm and one bomb was extinguished before it had really taken hold. A portion of it and also of the suitcase have been discovered and enquiries are being made. The two night watchmen were obviously fast asleep. One of them said that he could not imagine how the fire could have started since he had visited the site only 10 minutes previously. In actual fact he had never moved from his hut. Press and Censorship Bureau have been asked the issue the necessary D-notice.

[D Irving's comment: MI5 occasionally set fires or explosive charges near premises they wished to alert, or to enter with the emergency services. Perhaps this was one such raid.]

November 10, 1941: Victor has seen Wood of SIE in connection with Plan GUY FAWKES. Inspector Greeno of CID has discovered a part of the bomb. The CID made inquiries some time ago at the request of SO2 about the loss of a similar part and therefore recognised it. Wood appears to have fenced quite well and suggested to Greeno that he should consult Victor.

November 11, 1941: We have an extremely interesting case which centres round Stella Lonsdale, the wife of John Lonsdale, the Mayfair Boy. [. . .] *2 page complex story about agents Rene, Meissner, Gessler, operating in France, and whether any or all of them are in German control.*]

[. . .] TAR has seen the Commissioner about Plan GUY FAWKES. The Commissioner knows that the CID are working on the case but he has not told Kendal about the plan.

I forgot to mention that Dudley-Clarke was released [*in Spain, after Germans evidently intervened on his behalf*] about three weeks ago. The circumstances of his release were to say the least of it peculiar. At the time he was dressed as woman, complete with brassiere, etc. Why he wore this disguise nobody quite knows [. . .] Dudley-Clarke is now on his way home. Nobody can understand why it was necessary for him to go to Spain. Before he is allowed to go back to the Middle East he will have to give a satisfactory account of himself. It may be that he is just the type who imagines himself as the super secret service agent.

November 12, 1941: Victor has seen Inspector Greeno of the CID who has asked him some searching questions about Plan GUY FAWKES. Victor is trying to shepherd as much of the enquiry as possible into his own hands.

November 14, 1941: The Stella Lonsdale case has been handed to TAR [Robertson]. He is rather keen to use her as a XX [double cross agent.]

November 17, 1941: [. . .] [*More on feud with Cowgill.*] Quite briefly, our point of view is that we have to take the executive action against the German SS [security service] whenever it attempts to penetrate British territory. We must be in possession of knowledge about all its workings and agents in whatever part of the world they may be active. We realise that SIS obtain information affecting British territory and that we often obtain information affecting foreign territory, In fact if ISOS is excluded we are obtaining very nearly 75% of the information on the Abwehr. This illustrates the futility of trying to make any hard and fast dividing line. All that is necessary is close and unrestricted collaboration between the officers of all branches of Section V [of MI6] with their opposite numbers in the Security Service [MI5].

Jock Whyte is moaning about the case of Gunner Jackson. I have put it up to Cookie in order to get the Judge Advocate's decision. [. . .]

I had lunch with Fulford. He is rather concerned about the Duke of Bedford. There is a movement to have him arrested because it is thought that his propaganda will do a lot of harm in the USA. Fulford I think rather unwisely considers that his arrest would do more harm than good since it would give the Duke an enhanced importance. At the moment it is like a voice crying in the wilderness. [Lord] Swinton's view and I understand [Herbert] Morrison's is that if the Duke is not dealt with there will be a cry of one law for the rich and another for the poor.

[. . .] We had the famous meeting [*on the feud between MI6 and*

MI5] with SIS Stewart [Menzies], VV, Harker, Dick and myself, with the DG in the chair. DG made a few introductory remarks [. . .] [*A four page summary*] [. . .] I said briefly that it was the responsibility of the Security Service to combat the activities of the German Intelligence service wherever it was directed against this country or British possessions, including Egypt and Palestine [. . .] Felix [Cowgill] was apparently horrified because so many people knew about ISOS. Dick [White] replied that at last 50 people knew about it in [MI6's] Section V, and I asked how many people knew about it on the G. side. Stewart said only 4 or 5. I found this difficult to believe [. . .] The DG took a strong view about Felix. He thought that he ought to be sent away for a long period. He has grossly overworked himself and had in consequence taken up a very narrow bigoted attitude. I think all present agreed that the real difficulty was Felix's personality.

I went over to a meeting at the War Cabinet presided over by Gen. Dewing. [*to consider how German general staff might plan an invasion of UK. Five page summary.*]

November 20, 1941: DG asked me to come down and see William Dwight Whitney, who is Bill Donovan's [OSS] representative over here and will have a small staff working under him. He is to have an office somewhere in Bush House which will be for press and propaganda. This will act as cover. His main purpose is to collect as much vital information as he can which has any bearing on the part being played by the USA and the possibility of her entering the war. This information will go direct to Bill Donovan in special cypher for the President. Lastly he is to try and lay the foundations of some organisation for penetrating the continent both on SIS and SOE lines. It seems to me that this is going to complicate life considerably for SIS. It is bad enough having an English SOE, but if there is to be an American one as well I fear there may

be a major disaster.

November 21, 1941: I saw Marriott's brother and Shankland from the BBC. They came to discuss the various German broadcasts which they have been monitoring since about May 1940. These broadcasts were originally taken by MI8 and I gather at the request of the WO they were taken over by the BBC [. . .] I told Marriott that I had only learned that we were receiving these broadcasts about 10 days ago, that I had then discussed them with those concerned. From what I had been told about them it seemed that the obscure references which had the appearance of code could not be dealt with by any code section except in the light of other information available. In the Case of Anna Wolkoff [*associate of Tyler Kent*] it had been very valuable to us to produce in court the code messages from [Lord] Haw Haw [William Joyce] implying the receipt of Anna Wolkoff's message [. . .].

November 24, 1941: Jock Whyte tells me that Gunner Jackson never turned up at the meeting. It subsequently transpired that his battery had been on the move and another rendezvous will be arranged.

November 25, 1941: I gave a lecture to the RSLOs in answer to a request from Baxter that they should be given a general picture of the B. Division angle. I divided the talk into four parts:

(1). An account of the German activities prior to the war and up to the time of the invasion of the Low Countries [May 10, 1940]. I took the view that as their main effort had been concentrated on propaganda and capacity to make war, it seemed that they had not found it necessary for this purpose to establish any deep seated organisation. They probably had not contemplated invasion till they reached the Low Countries. It was for this reason that their

early attempts to put in agents by parachute and rubber boat had been of a rather crude nature.

- (2). I dealt with the illegal landings by rubber boat and parachute. The first arrivals had one-way sets and instructions to fall back at the time of invasion with the British Forces giving particulars by wireless of movements of troops and morale. Later arrivals had two-way sets and were given very wide instructions to report on almost every aspect of their life in the country. The scene of their operations was the East coast of Scotland and an area covered by a triangle London-Oxford-Birmingham-The Wash-Cambridge-London. From August to December 1940 the questions they had been asked were mainly of a general nature, ie. Military and civilian. From then onwards they were mainly military until May 1941 when they again became general, with an emphasis on food prices, morale, etc. The emphasis on military activities up to May 1941 may have been due either to possibility of invasion or to a desire to know our military strength and the chances of putting an army on the Continent if the Germans decided to start a war on the Eastern Front. I then dealt with legal landings, both by escapees and by seamen. I said that the more recent escapee cases had shown attempts to penetrate our Services. The idea was that certain Norwegians should get themselves taken on by the British Service and return to Norway with a wireless set, where they would work under German control. There was a possibility that one of them might have been sent over to start 5th Column activities in the Norwegian forces, As regards seamen I quoted the cases of Laureyssens and Timmerman. The latter was interesting as he had evidently received very careful instructions from the Army, Navy and Air Force over a period of about 6 months. He had questionnaires from all three Services and had been told how to identify various forms of armament. He had also receive instructions in the use of secret ink. He had been detected through an examina-

tion of his kit. I then gave a short talk about illegal landings in Ireland, with particular reference to the case of Goertz and Plan Kathleen. Other subjects I dealt with were Neutral Embassies and Legations, 5th Column and sabotage. The principal Neutral Embassies and Legations were the Japanese and Spanish, in a lesser degree the Brazilian, Chilean and Swedish, all of which needed watching. We knew that throughout the world Japanese Consuls had been reporting on shipping. We also knew that the Spaniards had been reporting both on shipping, air raid damage and morale through their Consuls and had in addition a small network of journalists working under the direction of Alcazar de Velasco, a prominent member of the Falange, who was here for a short time as Press Attaché. In the 5th Column people the general indication was that while there were a number of isolated individuals, Germans, people extraction and members of the BUF who were ready to assist the enemy in any way they could, there was no widespread organisation working under direct German control. Those who had been apprehended had collected information but did not know how to transmit it to the enemy. I mentioned the cases of Hiscox, Dorothy, Stapleton and Gunner Jackson. As regards sabotage I said there was no evidence that the enemy had any widespread organisation, although he had attempted to send saboteurs to this country. Most of the cases investigated, and there were hundreds of them, showed that the damage was due to carelessness, ignorance or bloody-mindedness. On the other hand there had been attempt to place bombs in ships coming to this country from the Peninsula. It was perhaps reassuring that there had been no serious outbreaks of sabotage during August and September of last year, but we must expect that the enemy had improve his organisation and that members of the IRA may have had instructions to lie dormant until an invasion period. In part (3) of the lecture I tried to give some idea of how far we had been successful in countering enemy activities

against this country. I said that we had in all apprehended 47 individuals who were undoubtedly German agents operating against this country and 8 others who had been taken off the high seas and were intending to operate in other spheres. In Eire 8 spies had been apprehended and another was believed to be at large. In the field of special agents we had found that whenever the enemy was hard-pressed to get funds to this country or to communicate instructions rapidly he seemed to be forced to seek out assistance. We could not say positively that there were no illegal transmissions here, but the reliability of detection was improving. We still had the difficulty of possible ground-to-air transmissions by VHF. Perhaps our greatest anxiety were the people who came to join the allied forces since without prior knowledge they were difficult to pick up. Seamen presented similar difficulties. In Ireland we thought the authorities were extremely vigilant and that it was difficult for aliens to move about undetected. On the other hand if there was an influx of renegade Irishmen the situation presented great difficulties. With regard to Embassies and Consulates we were fairly well informed about the Japs and Spaniards but we could not escape the conclusion that a considerable amount of information passed through these channels although it might not be of a very high quality. In the 5th column field, while we did not think there was any widespread organisations we did think that there might be a considerable number of people both British and alien who in time of invasions would be seriously considering where their personal interests lay. In part (4) of my talk I tried to explain the action we were taking in all the various field which have been reviewed. B.1A were trying (1) to satisfy the enemy that the Germans had an adequate organisation here both for the purpose of espionage. (2) we were attempting to learn as much as possible about the enemy's organisation, methods and agents, in close collaboration with Section V. (3) that we were endeavouring to induce the enemy to send further agents to this country whose

identity would be known to us (4) we were operating through RSS in the matter of detection of possible transmissions from his country. For illegal landings we relied largely on the vigilance of the Home Guard, Police and Military. We also made a study of the tracks of enemy aircraft. In the matter of legal landings we were trying to penetrate the enemy's espionage system in the hope of getting prior knowledge of arrivals, but we had to rely to a large extent on the vigilance of the SCOs and the cross-examination at the RPS. We hoped to improve matters by recruiting agents on ships for a 3-fold purpose, firstly to collect data about individuals cafes rendezvous and foreign ports in enemy control, secondly to detect members of crews who behaved in a suspicious manner and thirdly to make approaches to the enemy in foreign ports on XX lines. In Ireland we had to rely very largely on our liaison with the RUC and Eire authorities. In the field of Embassies and Consulates we had made great efforts at penetration and had achieved a considerable measure of success. We had done our best to restrict as far as possible the movements of foreign attaches, and in the case of Japanese had persuaded the authorities to close down their consulates in India. We should have liked to have taken similar action here and in Rangoon, Singapore and Cape Town but in view of the possibility of reciprocal action in Shanghai and elsewhere this had not been thought desirable. In the 5th column field we hope to give assistance to the RSLOs by sending round suitable B2 officer who would give suggestions about the introduction of agents and then report back to headquarters. B.4A were also going through old file ostensibly to see whether there were any roots which had not so far been pulled up. I read to the meeting the DGs minutes about so-called "agent provocateur" methods. I explained that while he was not averse to such methods being employed he thought that each case should be considered very carefully and that action should be very closely directed from headquarters. Lastly I gave the meeting some ac-

counts of the way we were trying to handle the analysis of censorship material and increase our chance of picking up correspondence in secret ink. I also told them about the DOT and the microscope in case these might be of use to them in carrying out searches.

DB came to see me about George Knupfer who is associated with a young “White” Russian organisation known as Mladoross. Knupfer is bringing an action against the *Daily Express* who said that his organisation was working for the Nazis. Bracken wants to support the *DE* if they are on a good wicket, and has asked C for his assistance. C has told him that he thinks Mladoross is suspect and Bracken now wants to place the *DE* solicitors in touch with MI5.

[Following the entry for November 25 is a three page typed summary, photographed, but not copied here, of all German agents landed in the UK and nearby waters, by parachute and sea, by name, date, and purpose. This three page document is posted on the website as an image file]

November 28, 1941: Crauford [sic] came to see me about Denys Boyd-Carpenter, who had informed us that he was receiving correspondence from a German officer name Karl Bruckner, who was employed on Intelligence matters in France. These letters were said to reach B-C via Spain. B-C had said that he last met Bruckner in France in 1937 but we were inclined to disbelieve this since his passport which was dated 24 must have expired in 1934 and had not been renewed. Crauford went to see him with an 80a Order, and asked him to produce the letter. He found B-C in bed and with a certain amount of difficulty got from him a letter authorising Crauford to obtain the correspondence from Brucker [sic] from Vernon Bartlett [*a well known journalist*] to whom it

had been sent. Our files showed that Vernon Bartlett had been interested and that Isobel Cripps, Stafford Cripps's wife, had also had copies which she had sent to some high-up in a hush-hush dept. We have now had a letter from B-C's solicitors à propos of Crauford's visit. The solicitors explained that their client periodically went into a trance, when interesting facts were revealed to him. He attached great importance to the information he received but known that the authorities would not be likely to pay any attention to psychic transmissions, he had felt bound to invent the story about receiving the information by correspondence from enemy occupied territory. The solicitors had realised that their client had committed a breach of the regulations and hoped that we would take a lenient view of his conduct. We have now got to concern ourselves with finding out what circulation has been given to B-C's letters and to warning those concerned that they are wasting their time.

[There does not appear to be any entry for November 30, 1941].

PRO work 29.4.03

KV.4/189 December 1941 – May 1942.

December 1, 1941: I later attended a meeting at the HO [Home Office] at which it was decided to reverse the previous policy with regard to Japs. All seamen are to be interned and 100 others whom we think by reason of the area in which they live or the work they do might engage in activities detrimental to the state. Consulate telephones are to be cut off, and the Jap staff are to be under house arrest. There is to be one telephone line to the Embassy. I said that I could not commit myself finally to this policy since I did not know that the meeting was to discuss a reversal of a previously agreed policy I had not been able to consult the DG. I said

that it was impossible to express any views about the way that the Japs were likely to behave after a declaration of war. The FO representative who seemed to have a fair knowledge of Japanese habits and in fact looked rather like one himself did not think the Jap citizens here would give any trouble. He did however consider that it would be dangerous to leave them at large in a place like Singapore. He was anxious that we should be as conciliatory as possible since he feared reprisals in Shanghai where there are 10,000 British citizens, and in Tsientsin where there are also several thousand. He was more anxious about the fate of these people than the thousand British subjects who were residing in Japan proper.

December 4, 1941: At the RSS meeting, Dick [White] raised the question of Jap isos. We must assume that they will establish some kind of network in S America for communication across the Pacific. . . . A Jap BF [BJ?] indicates that if communications are cut in the event of war, the Embassy should rely upon communication through the Navy. The inference is that the Navy dept. here will have a powerful receiving set but that they will not be transmitting. The question of the installation of a transmitter was discussed some time ago between the Ambassador and his FO but was turned down for a variety of reasons. Arrangements may have been made by Naval cipher for the installation of a transmitting set but this seems doubtful. If there is a set here it has not so far shown any signs of life nor have any messages been transmitted which would normally have been sent by diplomatic, naval or military cipher. We knew this because all messages have been taken down and were numbered consecutively. However, in order to be quite sure we are having the vans out in order to do a bit of sniffing. If the Japs declare war they are going to notify their Embassies abroad by a code message [*the Winds Message*] in a broadcast. The BBC are looking out for this message and two representa-

tives of SIS are with them to assist. The Jap Embassy here had instructions to break up the cipher machines, so presumably in future they will be communicating through naval or military ciphers. It is difficult to see whether this is just nervousness or whether it is part of a pre-arranged plan to declare war on a given date. The FO have now gone back on the decision reached at the meeting at the HO to discuss the internment of Japs in the event of war. They say that they don't wish to intern anybody except the seamen, and that this was what was agreed.

December 5, 1941: Neville came up to see me about a serious case of leakage in the Admiralty. It is said that one of the First Lord's secretaries had passed information about the sinking of the *Barham* to a Professor Postan of MEW, who passed it on to other people in MEW. Eventually it got back to NID. I agreed to go with Neville, to see Farrer this afternoon. Neville wants to have everybody arrested.

. . . According to a BJ, the Germans are evidently anxious to bring the Japs into the war Ribbentrop in talking to the Jap ambassador in Berlin is putting up a terrific bluff about German successes and future plans. On the 29th November he said that Germany had more or less achieved here first objective in Russia though she would of course continue the campaign in the Caucasus. . . Ribbentrop was very noncommittal about the invasion of Britain and said that first of all Germany would deal with the Near East, Gib. and Africa. When this had been achieved and we had been driven from the Mediterranean, he thought probable that an invasion would no longer be necessary since we should capitulate. He hoped that the war might be over by the end of 1942, but envisaged the possibility of its continuing until 1943. The Jap reported this to Tokyo, without much comment, but seems to be impressed. He generally reports what he thinks Tokyo would like

to hear. The same may be said for Rome. The only objective reports that Tokyo gets are from London.

December 6, 1941: Lennox tells me that the Americans have agreed that if the Japs attack Thailand they will give us their full support. Roosevelt does not think however that he could bring the Americans in if the Japs do no more than carry out attacks on the Burma Road which is in fact something that they have done before without serious consequences. Anxiety is felt here as to what the Americans would do if the Japs succeeded in getting Thailand, through pressure, to acquiesce in occupation. This matter is being taken up with Winant, since from the point of view of our security it matters little whether the Japs get into Thailand through persuasion or aggression. Roosevelt has suggested to the Japs that they should maintain only a token force in Indo-China and that they should withdraw progressively from China. . . . Kurusu has said that at this stage such a suggestion can only be made direct by Roosevelt to the Emperor, the Govt of Japan had gone so far that they could not possibly accept these conditions as a basis for negotiations without losing face. If they are overridden by the Emperor, they will just resign, and a more moderate cabinet will be appointed in their place. It is difficult to know how far the Japs are just trailing their coat.

I have just heard that a convoy has been seen accompanied by Jap warships, and it is thought that an invasion of Thailand maybe imminent.

December 8, 1941: Action in connection with the Jap's declaration of war has been taken as follows: 70 seaman and 58 other Japs are being arrested. The Embassy, consulate, and military and naval attachés' offices are being left with only one telephone and all

employees have been confined to the three main buildings. The lines to Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Yokohama Specie [Bank: *see Jan 8, 1942*] have been left for the purpose of observation. . . . Hasegawa, one of the Domei [agency] correspondents, has disappeared from his home.

Borum came to see me about certain people who occupy flats over the [Japanese] Embassy. He would like them investigated from the security angle. He said he could not imagine how the American fleet had been caught napping. The *Oklahoma* was sunk and another battleship is on fire and sinking. Two destroyers and a gunboat have also been sunk.

December 11, 1941: Returned at midday. While I was away, Special Material indicated that an Englishman had correspondence which was of a compromising nature and had to be destroyed. He was in conversation with Kamimura. It was felt that the Englishman could only be Sempill and his apartment and office were consequently raided. Only a few Air Ministry and Admiralty reports of no particular interest were discovered. He has of course committed a technical breach of the regulations but we are fairly confident that he had not retained the documents for any ulterior purpose.

December 12, 1941: I lunched with Stewart [Hampshire]. It seems that the Americans lost 4 battleships in the first Jap assault and had a 5th damaged, apart from casualties to other craft. The result is that a large proportion of the Atlantic fleet has now been diverted to the Pacific and that all supplies from American have ceased for the time being. There is no doubt that the loss of the *Prince of Wales* and *Repulse* was due to the lack of supporting aircraft. Steps are being taken to remedy the situation. There are strong indications that the Germans are contemplating some

southward move with the object of securing a strong foothold in N Africa, possibly in conjunction with the French. . . . Canaris has recently been in Spain. This should be a further indication that the Germans are moving south.

Dudley Clarke was shipped some little time ago from Gib. to England, but was torpedoed, returned to Gib. and finally sent to the Middle east for disciplinary action. There are some interesting photographs of him in female attire which have been obtained from the Spanish police.

December 13, 1941: We had a discussion about the case of Sempill, when it was decided that Colonel Hinchley-Cooke, Major Cussen, and Inspector Grant of SB [Special branch] should summon Lord Sempill to the Yard and question him about the telephone conversations. Col. Wilson of SIS had been seen and emphatically expressed the view that the speaker was Sempill. He discounted the suggestion that it might have been Edwardes, on the ground that he knew Edwardes[s'] voice quite well.

December 15, 1941: I lunched with [Hugh] Trevor-Roper, who is very worried about the capabilities of Madement in connection with the pioneering work which is has been decided to do in Canada on Jap isos. He thinks that the only really suitable man is Gill who did all the pioneering work on the German isos. T-R thinks that the matter ought to be brought to the notice of Lord Swinton, There are obvious difficulties here as we should be interfering in a technical matter of which we have no real knowledge. I am fairly confident that T-R is correct in his views. We shall have to see what we can do.

Sir Francis Lindley has been seen in connection with the Sempill case. He states that at the time of the first telephone conversation

Sempill was in fact attending a meeting of the Japan Society, that he did not leave the room, and that afterwards he accompanied Sir Francis for a period of about 20 minutes. This statement in fact corresponds with the report of the watchers who gave quite an accurate description of Sir Francis. It looks therefore as if the first and second conversations were not related. The second one, in which some uneducated Englishman speaking to Kamimura, delivers a message on behalf of "Bill S" is still unexplained; personally I think it undoubtedly refers to Sempill who has denied that he has communicated either directly or indirectly with any members of the Jap Embassy since the outbreak of war. The message delivered to Kamimura was to the effect that Bill S had been going through a difficult time but that everything was being taken care of. Kamimura was to remember that Bill S had not communicated with him since the outbreak of war. The implication was that in fact he had so communicated.

December 16, 1941: . . . I attended a meeting called by [Lord] Swinton at which DG and CSS [Menzies] were present. We discussed the question of shipping security. . . . C agreed to these exploratory measures subject to approval by the Admiralty and Ministry of War Transport. It was decided therefore to call a meeting of these bodies and SIS and ourselves. C spoke very strongly about overloading of Security Co-ordination [William Stephenson] in the Americas. He said that the organization was not getting so big that its main function, namely the obtaining of intelligence and CE [counterespionage] work, was being neglected. Swinton saw the point but did not feel that Stephenson's extraneous activities could be controlled by anyone else.

December 17, 1941: DDG held a meeting on the subject of the Sempill case, when all aspects of the case were discussed with all concerned. It was agreed that in the light of the evidence available it

was almost impossible for Sempill to have been a party to the first telephone conversation. There were 3 witnesses and the watches to corroborate the fact that he could not have had access to the telephone at the material time. On the other hand it seemed at least probable that Edwardes might have been the man who rang up the embassy. It will be remembered that Col. Wilson had discredited Edwardes on the ground that he knew his voice. . . . We also had a report from our informant in the embassy that it was Edwardes, and not Sempill, who had been responsible for a conversation about the retention of the services of Mrs Dixon who had been employed by the Ambassador. . . . Edwardes was the only other person known to us who might fit the bill. As a servant of the Jap Embassy he would naturally have had books and papers relating to Embassy business and he might well have sought Kamimura's instructions about their retention or destruction. It was decided therefore that Major Cussen and Mr Young should interview Edwardes with a view to obtaining some sort of confirmation from him. [Edwardes seen later and denied it.] [More on T-R, Gill, Morton Evans, Canada and Madement.]

December 19, 1941: Stewart [Hampshire] told me today that the lost bag at Ankara has now been found in a lumber room. The Embassy are so naïve as to think that it has not been compromised.

December 29, 1941: . . . I had a discussion afterwards with U.35 [*a four letter name*] about Vera [Eriksson?] He is quite ready to have her but would welcome the assistance of one of TAR's [T A Robertson's] FSPs. He does not wish to see Vera until she arrives at his house.

December 30, 1941: "DUCK" [*a female agent, specializing in burglaries of embassies, e.g. the Spanish*] has produced a re-ciphering

ticker tape and a number of cypher messages with the re-ciphering figures written in underneath. These are of the greatest value to GC&CS.

BALLOON has received a letter with Duff [*evidently some kind of microdot?*] cleverly concealed under the flap. GPO failed to detect it.

December 31, 1941: Victor [Rothschild] has had a talk with Swinton about the new substance called Lauryl Thio-Cyanite [sic. -Cyanate?] which if worn in a belt, kills or drives away lice. This new discovery might have a very important bearing on the course of the war owing to the fact that lice are the bearers of typhus and that this disease is prevalent in Russia. The medical authorities were just about to publish the information about this new discovery in some medical journal. This has now been prevented.